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Abstract
Negotiation is a fundamental interaction mechanism in multi-agent systems because it allows self-interested agents to come
to mutually beneﬁcial agreements and partition resources efﬁciently and effectively. Now, in many situations, the agents need to
negotiate with one another many times and so developing strategies that are effective over repeated interactions is an important
challenge. Against this background, a growing body of work has examined the use of Persuasive Negotiation (PN), which involves
negotiating using rhetorical arguments (such as threats, rewards, or appeals), in trying to convince an opponent to accept a given
offer. Such mechanisms are especially suited to repeated encounters because they allow agents to inﬂuence the outcomes of future
negotiations, while negotiating a deal in the present one, with the aim of producing results that are beneﬁcial to both parties. To
this end, in this paper, we develop a comprehensive PN mechanism for repeated interactions that makes use of rewards that can be
asked for or given to. Our mechanism consists of two parts. First, a novel protocol that structures the interaction by capturing the
commitments that agents incur when using rewards. Second, a new reward generation algorithm that constructs promises of rewards
in future interactions as a means of permitting agents to reach better agreements, in a shorter time, in the present encounter. We then
go on to develop a speciﬁc negotiation tactic, based on this reward generation algorithm, and show that it can achieve signiﬁcantly
better outcomes than existing benchmark tactics that do not use such inducements. Speciﬁcally, we show, via empirical evaluation
in a Multi-Move Prisoners’ Dilemma setting, that our tactic can lead to a 26% improvement in the utility of deals that are made
and that 21 times fewer messages need to be exchanged in order to achieve this.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Negotiation is a fundamental concept in multi-agent systems (MAS) because it enables self-interested agents to
ﬁnd agreements and partition resources efﬁciently and effectively. In most cases, such negotiation proceeds as a series
of offers and counter-offers [20]. These offers generally indicate the preferred outcome for the proponent and the
opponent may either accept them, counter-offer a more beneﬁcial outcome, or reject them. Now, in many cases, the
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: sdr@ecs.soton.ac.uk (S.D. Ramchurn), sierra@iiia.csic.es (C. Sierra), godo@iiia.csic.es (L. Godo), nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk
(N.R. Jennings).
0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2007.04.014806 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
agents involved need to negotiate with one another many times. However, such repeated encounters have rarely been
dealt with in the multi-agent systems literature (see Section 7 for more details). One of the main reasons for this is
that repeated encounters require additional mechanisms and structures, over and above those required for single shot
encounters, to fully take into account the repeated nature of the interaction. In particular, offers that are generated
should not only inﬂuence the present encounter, but also future ones, so that better deals can be found in the long run
[9,25]. To this end, argument-based negotiation (ABN), in which arguments are used to support offers and persuade
an opponent to accept them, has been advocated as an effective means to achieve this [30,36] and, therefore, this is
the approach we explore in this paper.
In more detail, ABN techniques aim to enable agents to achieve better agreements faster by allowing them to
explore a larger space of possible solutions and/or to express, update, or evolve their preferences in single or multiple
shot interactions [21]. They do this by providing additional explanations that justify the offer [1], identifying other
goals satisﬁed by the offer that the opponent might not be aware of [31], or offering additional incentives conditional
upon the acceptance of the offer [2,22,39]. While all these approaches capture, in one way or another, the notion
of persuasiveness, a number of them have focused speciﬁcally on the use of rhetorical arguments such as threats,
rewards, and appeals [3,28,41,44]. To be clear, here, we categorise such argument acts as persuasive elements that
aim to force, entice, or convince an opponent to accept a given offer (see Section 7 for more details). In particular,
we categorise such approaches under the general term of Persuasive Negotiation (PN) to denote the fact that these try
to ﬁnd additional incentives (as opposed to justifying or elaborating on the goals of an offer) to move an opponent to
accept a given offer [30,36].
In order to implement a PN mechanism, it is critical that the exchanges between the negotiating agents follow a
given pattern (i.e. ensuring that agents are seen to execute what they propose and that the negotiation terminates) and
that the agents are endowed with appropriate techniques to generate such exchanges (i.e. they can evaluate offers and
counter-offers during the negotiation process). These requirements can be met through the speciﬁcation of a protocol
that dictates what agents are allowed to offer or commit to execute and a reasoning mechanism that allows agents
to make sense of the offers exchanged and accordingly determine their best response [30]. Given this, we present a
novel protocol and reasoning mechanism for pairs of agents to engage in PN in the context of repeated games, in
which the participating agents have to negotiate over a number of issues many times. In particular, we focus on the
exchange of rewards (as opposed to threats or appeals). We do so because rewards have a clear beneﬁt for the agent
receiving it, and entail a direct commitment by the agent giving it, to continue a long term relationship which is likely
to be beneﬁcial to both participating agents.1 In addition to the standard use of rewards as something that is offered
as a prize or gift, our model also allows agents to ‘ask’ for rewards in an attempt to secure better outcomes in the
future, while conceding in the current encounter and therefore closing the deal more quickly. This latter perspective is
common in human-to-human negotiations where one of the participants may ask for a subsequent favour in return for
agreeing to concede in the current round [17,33].
Being more speciﬁc still, our PN mechanism constructs possible rewards in terms of constraints on issues to be
negotiated in future encounters and our protocol extends Rubinstein’s [37] alternating offers protocol to allow agents
to negotiate by exchanging arguments along with their offers (in the form of promises of future rewards or requests
for such promises in future encounters).
Example. A car seller may reward a buyer who prefers red cars with a promise (or the buyer might ask for the reward)
of a discount of at least 10% (i.e. a constraint on the price the seller can propose next time) on the price of her yearly
car servicing if she agrees to buy a blue one instead at the demanded price (as the buyer’s asking price for the red car
is too low for the seller). Now, if the buyer accepts, it is a better outcome for both parties; the buyer beneﬁts because
she is able to make savings in future that match her preference for the red car and the seller beneﬁts in that he reduces
his stock and obtains immediate proﬁt.
1 The use of appeals and threats poses a number of problems. For example, the use of appeals usually assumes agents implement the same
deductive mechanism (an overly constraining assumption in most cases) because appeals impact directly on an agent’s beliefs or goals which
means that such appeals need to adopt a commonly understood belief and goal representation [1,3,22]. Threats, in turn, tend to break relationships
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We believe such promises are important in repeated interactions for a number of reasons. First, agents may be
able to reach an agreement faster in the present game by providing some guarantees over the outcome of subsequent
games. Thus, agents may ﬁnd the current offer and the reward worth more than a counter-offer (which only delays
the agreement and future games). Second, by involving issues from future negotiations in the present game (as in
the cost of servicing in the example above), we effectively expand the negotiation space considered and, therefore,
provide more possibilities for ﬁnding (better) agreements in the long run [20]. For example, agents that value future
outcomes more (because of their lower discount factors) than their opponent are able to obtain a higher utility in
future games, while the opponent who values immediate rewards can take them more quickly. Thirdly, if the reward
guarantees the range of possible outcomes in the next game, the corresponding negotiation space is constrained by
the reward, which should reduce the number of offers exchanged to search the space and hence the time elapsed
before an agreement is reached. Continuing the above example, the buyer starts off with an advantage next time she
wants to negotiate the price to service her car and she may then not need to negotiate for long to get a reasonable
agreement.
Against this background, this work advances the state of the art in the following ways. First, we provide a new
alternating offers protocol that extends the alternating offers protocol and builds upon Bentahar et al. [6] to specify
commitments that agents make to each other when engaging in persuasive negotiations using rewards. Speciﬁcally,
the protocol details, using dynamic logic, how commitments arise or get retracted as a result of agents promising
rewards or making offers. Thus, by using our protocol, it is possible to keep track of the commitments made and
therefore ensure that they do enact the rewards or offers they commit to. The protocol also standardises what an agent
is allowed to say or what it can expect to receive from its opponent which, in turn, allows it to focus on making the
important negotiation decisions. Second, as part of an agent’s reasoning mechanism, we develop a Reward Generation
Algorithm (RGA) that calculates constraints (which act as rewards) on resources that are to be negotiated in future
games. The RGA thus provides the ﬁrst heuristic to compute and select rewards to be given and asked for. Third, we
develop a speciﬁc Reward Based Tactic (RBT) that uses the RGA to generate combinations of offers and rewards. In
so doing, we provide the ﬁrst PN tactic that considers the repeated nature of interactions when generating offers and
rewards. We then go on to show that RBT can reach better agreements (up to 26% more utility) in less time (using 21
times fewer messages) than standard non-persuasive negotiation tactics.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic deﬁnitions of repeated negotia-
tion games and the properties of the agents. Section 3 details our PN protocol and Section 4 presents the RGA and the
functions used by the agents to evaluate incoming offers and rewards. Given this, Section 5 describes the RBT algo-
rithm. In Section 6, we empirically evaluate the RBT and benchmark it against other standard negotiation algorithms.
Section 7 details related work and Section 8 concludes.
2. Repeated negotiation games
In this section we formalise the repeated negotiation games within which we apply PN. Thus, let Ag be the set
of agents and X be the set of negotiable issues. Agents negotiate about issues x1,...,xn ∈ X where each one has
a value vi in its domain D1,...,Dn. Then, a contract O ∈ O is a set of issue-value pairs, noted as O ={ (x1 =
v1),...,(xm = vm)}, where O is the set of all such contracts.2 We will also note the set of issues involved in a contract
O as X(O)⊆ X. During negotiation, an agent can limit the range of values it can accept for each issue, termed its
negotiation range and noted as [v
xi
min,v
xi
max]. Without loss of generality, we require that each variable xi in a contract
occurs at most once and that the number of variables and the values taken by them is ﬁnite.
Given these basic deﬁnitions, a negotiation game is one in which an agent starts by making an offer O ={ (x1 =
v1),...,(xm = vm)} (with or without rewards) over a set of issues {x1,...,xm}⊆X and the opponent may then
counter-offer or accept. The agents may then go on counter-offering until an agreement is reached or the deadline
tdead is reached (we superscript it with the agent identiﬁer where needed).3 While it is possible to consider inﬁnitely
2 Other operators , can also be used. This means agents can specify a range of values to enact rather than a speciﬁc value. This will be
important when we need to specify rewards in Section 4.2.
3 If an agreement is reached, the agents are committed to enacting the deal settled on according to the protocol deﬁned in Section 3. Note, if
they cannot be forced to enact a deal, a trust model such as [34,43] can be used to check for this and the behaviour of the agent can be altered
accordingly. However, the latter case is beyond the scope of this work.808 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
Table 1
Summary of notation used
Ag the set of agents (usually α and β).
O the set of contracts (a contract is O ∈ O).
U(O) the utility of a contract.
Oα a contract in which ∀xi ∈ X(Oα),|δUα
xi|  |δU
β
xi|.
X the set of negotiated issues x1,x2,....
[v
xi
min,v
xi
max] the negotiation range of a given issue xi.
t time since ﬁrst negotiation game started.
θ the delay between two negotiation games.
τ the time between two offers.
 α the discount factor of agent α.
e− α(θ+t) the discount between games for agent α.
e− α(τ+t) the discount between offers for agent α.
tα
dead the deadline of the negotiation game for α.
Lα the target utility of agent α.
or ﬁnitely repeated games, we focus on the base case of one repetition in this work because we aim to understand
at a foundational level the impact that promises of future rewards may have on such encounters. We also constrain
the games, and further differentiate them from the case where agents play one game each time independently of the
ﬁrst one, by allowing the second game to happen if and only if the current game has a successful outcome (i.e. an
agreement is reached within the agents’ deadlines). In so doing, there is no possibility for agents to negotiate both
outcomes in one negotiation round. The agents may also come to an agreement in the ﬁrst game but fail to reach
one in the second game, in which case they only obtain utility from the outcome of the ﬁrst game. This, we believe,
more closely models realistic applications where agents will engage in long-term relationships only if they can ﬁnd
some beneﬁt in so doing given the result of their previous agreement (i.e. reach some agreements prior to continuing
their relationship). Such approaches are common in long-term contracting or relationships as deﬁned in the economic
literature [9,25]. Negotiation games are played in sequence and there may be a delay θ between the end of the ﬁrst
game and the beginning of the second one. Moreover, during a game, the time between each transmitted offer is noted
as τ.
In each negotiation game, agents can assess the value of offers exchanged using their utility function. Each agent
has a (privately known) utility function over each issue Uxi :Dxi →[ 0,1] and the utility over a contract U :O →[ 0,1]
is deﬁned as:
U(O)=

i=1,...,m
wiUxi(vi) (1)
where O ={ (x1 = v1),...,(xm = vm)}, wi is the weight given to issue xi and

wi = 1. We consider two agents
α,β ∈ Ag having utility functions designed as per the Multi-Move Prisoners’ Dilemma (MMPD) (this game is chosen
because of its canonical and ubiquitous nature—see Appendix A for more details) [5,7,46]. According to this game,
α’s marginal utility δU is higher (on an absolute scale) than β’s for some issues, which we note as Oα, and less for
others, noted as Oβ, where Oα ∪Oβ = O.4 Moreover, given the delays that exist between and during games, agents’
utilities will be discounted as follows. In between games, the discount is computed as e− (θ+t) and between offers it
is e− (τ+t) where t is the time since the negotiation started (note that we expect θ   τ generally) and   is known as
the discount factor of the agent.5 The value of   scales the impact of these delays, where a higher value means a more
signiﬁcant discounting of an offer and a lower value means a lower discounting effect. Finally, each agent is assumed
to have a target utility to achieve over the two games (noted as L ∈[ 0,2]). This target can be regarded as the agent’s
4 By establishing such a relationship between the agents’ utility functions, we aim to make our model applicable to more realistic settings. Also,
we believe it is not unreasonable to assume that agents could estimate which issues are more important (i.e. have a higher |δU|) to them or to their
opponent. In any case, our mechanism also applies to the case where agents’ marginal utilities sum to zero (in which case the agents play a common
zero-sum game [25]).
5 The exponential decay function is commonly used in bargaining theory to capture the cumulative discounting effect of delays between offers.
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aspiration level for the combined outcomes of the two games [13]. This target must, therefore, be less than or equal
to the sum of the maximum achievable utility over the two games (2 in the case an agent has a   = 0 and exploits
both games completely); that is L  1 + e− (θ+t), where 1 is the maximum achievable utility in an undiscounted
game.
Having deﬁned the basic constructs of repeated negotiation games, we summarise the notation used in Table 1. In
the next section, we describe the negotiation protocol. To this end, we build upon the notation presented in this section
in order to clearly specify the semantics of the interaction.
3. The negotiation protocol
As discussed earlier, negotiation proceeds via an exchange of offers and counter-offers [37]. In general, the pro-
tocol speciﬁcation of this interaction is rather simple in that there is only one type of commitment upheld by each
agent at any one time (that is enacting the proposal if its offer is accepted). However, extending the protocol to en-
capsulate persuasive elements such as rewards means that other commitments (pertaining to the enactment of the
content of rewards) must be speciﬁed for the agents issuing these rewards [6,23,47]. We term these commitments
social commitments since they are pledges made by agents by virtue of their publicly visible actions or utterances.
These commitments can then be checked by an institution or arbitrator to make sure that the agents are doing what
they are supposed to and thus provide guarantees of proper behaviour [30].
There are a number of representations that can be used to specify how these commitments can be made or retracted
by the illocutions (what the agents say) and the actions (what the agents do) [30]. However, given that rewards are
likely to result in a large number of states and state transitions and that the enactment of rewards requires clear
semantics of actions to be performed, we specify our protocol using Harel’s dynamic logic (DL) [18]. This type of
action-based logic is particularly suitable for specifying programs or sets of actions which have start and termination
conditions and constructs similar to a negotiation encounter. Speciﬁcally, we build upon the work of [6] to cater for
rewards. To this end, we ﬁrst provide a brief overview of the constructs of dynamic logic and then specify the syntax
and semantics of the language used to describe the protocol. Finally, we detail the axioms that capture the impact of
illocutions and other actions taken by agents in a negotiation encounter.
3.1. Preliminaries
Dynamic logic has been proposed as a multimodal logical system to give semantics to programs. A program can
be conceived as a combination of actions that change the state of the world. The main components of DL are thus a
set of atomic programs a0,a1,...∈ Π0 and a set of modal formulae Φ to describe the world states (see [18] for more
details). The atomic actions are basic, indivisible, and execute in a single step. Given this, a program Π is generated
by composing actions using a number of operators such that if a, b ∈ Π then:
• a;b ∈ Π signiﬁes that b is performed after a (i.e. sequential composition).
• a∗ ∈ Π represents an iteration of a an indeterminate number of times.
• ϕ? ∈ Π tests whether the formula ϕ ∈ Φ is satisﬁed in the current state.
• a ∪b ∈ Π speciﬁes a non-deterministic execution of either a or b.
Moreover, [a]ϕ denotes that after program a ∈ Π is executed, it is necessary that ϕ is true.  a ϕ denotes that after
program a ∈ Π is executed, it is possible that ϕ is true. The propositional operators ∧,∨,¬,↔, and 1 can be deﬁned
from → and 0 in the usual way.
DL semantics are based on Kripke-style structures M = (S,τ,ρ)where S represent the set of states, τ :Φ → 2S
gives the states where a formula is true, and ρ:Π → 2S×S is a function taking a program as argument and giving the
corresponding set of pairs of starting and end states that the program connects.
In the following subsections we deﬁne a particular theory called PN (for persuasive negotiation) over DL to model
a persuasive negotiation dialogue. To do so, we ﬁrst describe the language, that is the set Π0 of illocutionary (or
other) actions that agents interchange, and the set of formulae Φ that will describe the state of a negotiation encounter.
Given these, we provide a set of axioms that express the constraints which apply within our persuasive negotiation
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3.2. The PN language
In this section we describe the main components of the language. We ﬁrst formalise the notion of contracts as an
action that agents can execute. Second, we describe the illocutions that can be exchanged during the dialogue and,
third, we detail the predicates that are used to represent the state of the world.
3.2.1. Contracts
The central element of PN is the contract that agents negotiate upon. We extend the notion of a contract given
in Section 2 to capture the fact that agents execute elements of a contract. To this end, we note the set of formulae
ASG ⊂ Φ as consisting of atomic assignments of the form xi = vi and conjunctions of atomic assignments (x1 =
v1) ∧ (x2 = v2) ∧···∧(xn = vn).6 We also introduce the operator Do to represent contracts as atomic actions to
be more consistent with the logical language representation used in this section. Thus, what we deﬁne as a contract
{(x1 = v1,...,(xm = vm)} is equivalent to Do((x1 = v1) ∧···∧(xm = vm)). Moreover, a union of contracts {x1 =
v1),(x2 = v2)} and {(x3 = v3),(x4 = v4)} to {x1 = v1),(x2 = v2),(x3 = v3),(x4 = v4)} is equivalent to a conjunction
of the contents of the two contracts, that is, Do((x1 = v1)∧(x2 = v2)∧(x3 = v3)∧(x4 = v4)).7
Given the above deﬁnitions, a contract Do(ϕ) ∈ O, with ϕ ∈ ASG, represents the action of making the assignment
ϕ true.8
3.2.2. Illocutions
Agents negotiate by sending illocutions which represent offers and counter-offers. These illocutions are considered
to be actions in our setting as per speech-act theory [4,38]. Illocutions generally talk about other illocutions (to be sent
at a later time) or about contracts that can be made between the pair of negotiating agents. Here our set of illocutions
I ⊂ Π0 consists of two general classes. The ﬁrst consists of the proper negotiation illocutions Ineg, while the second
contains those illocutions Ipers that are added to form the persuasive part of negotiation. We will denote by Iα and Iβ
the set of all illocutions that α and β can send respectively.
First, negotiation illocutions from Ineg have the general form:
• propose(α,β,p)—denotes that α sends a proposal to β to accept the deal given in p ∈ O.
• accept(α,β,p)—denotes that α accepts to enact the contract p ∈ O.
Second, persuasive illocutions from Ipers have the general form:
• reward(α,β,p,q)—denotes that α will reward β with q ∈ O ∪ Iα if β accepts the contract p ∈ O and p is
enacted. As can be seen, q can either be a deal that is favourable to β or an illocution that will help β in future
(e.g. enhance the reputation of β or an unconditional accept of a deal to be presented at a later time).
• askreward(α,β,p,q)—denotes that α asks for a reward q ∈ O ∪ Iβ from β if β accepts the offer presented in
p ∈ O and p is enacted.
3.2.3. World description
As discussed in Section 3.1, the actions or programs performed by agents result in changes in the state of the world.
In our model, programs consist of a number of illocutions or contract executions. To represent the consequences of
theses actions we exploit the theory presented by [6]. In their model, the authors prescribe commitments that hold in
different states of the world and agents are able to navigate between different states through the actions they perform.
In short, these actions lead to some commitments becoming true or false. We therefore extend the work of Bentahar et
al. to incorporate the notion of commitment in the framework of persuasive negotiation. To this end, we ﬁrst conceive
6 Other mathematical operations such as ,=, can also be used in contracts as discussed in Section 2.
7 Actually, when committing to the execution of a contract an agent α commits to make true those variable bindings of issues that are under the
agent’s control (that is, issues in Xα). However to simplify notation we’ll just represent that the agent is socially committed to the whole contract.
8 Whenever we apply an operator to a formula or action, like in Do(ϕ) or later with propose, reward, SC, etc., we actually mean the application of
the operator over a term representing the formula. This is sometimes represented with the Gödel quotes: Do( ϕ ). We will, however, abuse notation
and omit the quotes.S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 811
of the set of social commitments that can be made in a dialogue as a result of illocutions being uttered and that can
be retracted as other illocutions are uttered or other actions are executed. At the beginning of a negotiation dialogue
(i.e. before any agent says anything), all the commitments are false. As the negotiation proceeds, some will become
true (active) or false (inactive) according to the illocutions sent. Some commitments might also become false when
some actions are performed after negotiation. In order to represent commitments in the negotiation state we need to
introduce special operators to describe them:
• SC(α,β,ϕ,q)∈ Φ denotes a commitment from α to β to enact q given ϕ is satisﬁed. Here, q ∈ O ∪ Iα, ϕ =
Done(a1)∧···∧Done(an) ∈ Φ to denote that the commitment is conditional upon the enactment of a number of
actions (a1 to an)o rϕ = true to denote that the commitment is unconditional.
• Done(a) ∈ Φ where a ∈ Π to denote that action a has been performed.
For instance, SC(α,β,Done(propose(α,β,p);accept(β,α,p)),p) means that in case β accepts contract p pro-
posed by α then α is also committed to β over the same contract. Moreover, arbitrary compound formulae in Φ can
be constructed from these atomic formulae and formulae in ASG using the standard connectives ∧,∨,¬. For example
SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p))∧Done(p),q) means that α is committed to doing q if β has accepted an offer p and
p has been done.
Building on these basic elements, the set of states S of the DL framework will be determined, in our setting, by
the truth values of three types of formulae; (i) assignments of values to issues (e.g. (x = v)), (ii) instances of Done
predicates (e.g. Done(p)), and (iii) instances of SC predicates (e.g. SC(α,β,ϕ,p)). Thus, each state of the world can
be described by a (possibly partial) assignment of the values to some issues, actions that have been already performed,
and social commitments that are active.
Given the deﬁnition of the semantics of the PN language, we next describe the axioms that support the basic rules
of our persuasive negotiation protocol.
3.3. The PN axioms
We ﬁrst explain the three basic axioms regarding the meaning of the operators Do and Done:
•[ Do(ϕ)]ϕ—after the execution of Do(ϕ), necessarily ϕ is true.
•[ a]Done(a)—after executing action a, necessarily the formula Done(a) is true.
• Done(a;b) → Done(a) ∧ Done(b)—the execution of the action sequence a;b implies that a and b have been
performed.
Next, we capture the relationship between illocutions and social commitments. We avoid the rules depicting the
turn-taking procedure that normally happens in negotiation in order to focus on the essential features of the commit-
ments with respect to the enactment of proposals and rewards:9
•[ propose(α,β,p)]SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p)),p).
This means that after propose(α,β,p)is uttered, α commits to enact p if β accepts the proposal.
•[ reward(α,β,p,q)](SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p)),p)∧SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p))∧Done(p),q)).
This means that after reward(α,β,p,q)is uttered, α commits to its part of the deal p if β accepts the deal p.
Moreover, α commits to make the reward q ∈ O ∪Iα happen once the contract p is made true.
•[ askreward(α,β,p,q)](SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p)),p)∧SC(β,α,Done(accept(β,α,p))∧Done(p),q)).
This means that after askreward(α,β,p,q)is uttered, α commits to its part of the deal p if β accepts the con-
tract p. Moreover, β commits to make the reward q ∈ O ∪Iβ happen once the contract p is made true.
9 The rules of encounter we use are the ones described in Section 2. The logical representation of these rules could be further formalised using
DL to ﬁner levels of granularity so as to describe turn-taking, deadlines to send new proposals or rewards, and withdrawal from the negotiation.
Examples of negotiation protocols that cater for some of these rules can be found in [23,27]. However, here we choose to focus on what we believe
to be the bare essentials of a protocol with respect to persuasive negotiation.812 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
We next outline the axioms that specify the dynamics of the social commitments when actions are performed:
• Unconditionally committing to enacting a contract or reward:
SC

α,β,Done(a),p

→[ a]

¬SC

α,β,Done(a),p

∧SC(α,β,true,p)

In this case, once the action a has been done, α is committed to enacting p (which could be a contract or a reward)
without any conditions. This is usually the case when a is an accept of the offer to do p or when a is a contract
that had to be executed before a reward p were to be given.
• Conditionally committing to enacting a contract or reward:
SC

α,β,Done(a)∧ϕ,p

→[ a]

¬SC

α,β,Done(a)∧ϕ,p

∧SC(α,β,ϕ,p)

In this case, once action a has been done, α only commits to do p if ϕ is true. This can happen, for example, if
ar e w a r dp has been offered and ϕ represents the enactment of the offer (accepted through action a) conditional
upon which the reward p was to be enacted.
• Enacting a contract or reward:
SC(α,β,true,p)→[ p]¬SC(α,β,true,p)
This simply means that a commitment to enact a contract or reward is revoked once the contract or reward is
enacted.
We ﬁnally describe the basic axioms that ensure that agents commit to the most up-to-date contract or rewards:
• Committing to only one contract at a time:
– [propose(α,β,p)]¬SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p )),p ),f o rp   = p.
– [reward(α,β,p,q)]¬SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p )),p ),f o rp   = p.
– [askreward(α,β,p,q)]¬SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p )),p ),f o rp   = p.
These mean that a commitment to a previous offer is retracted when a new contract is offered, or a reward is given
or asked for with a new offer.
• Committing to only one reward at a time:
– [reward(α,β,p,q)]¬SC(α,β,Done(accept(β,α,p))∧Done(p),q ),f o rq   = q.
– [askreward(α,β,p,q)]¬SC(β,α,Done(accept(β,α,p))∧Done(p),q ),f o rq   = q.
These mean that a commitment to a previous reward is retracted when a new reward is given or asked for.
Using all the above axioms, it is possible to automatically check what agents are allowed to say or do at any point
during the negotiation dialogue and after the negotiation has ended. This can be achieved by storing each commitment
incurred during the dialogue in a commitment store and, as new illocutions are issued, these are checked against
the commitment store to see if they can be accepted and then used to make certain existing commitments active or
inactive. Such a mechanism can easily be built into an electronic institution for automated checking (e.g. [10,11,30]).
4. The persuasive negotiation strategy
The protocol we have described in the previous section structures interactions between agents as it allows them
to understand the messages exchanged and the commitments they make while negotiating. However, protocols, such
as ours, do not give any indication about the content of offers or rewards that agents need to devise in order to reach
good agreements, nor do they indicate when and how to send such offers and rewards (which determine the agents’
strategy). Therefore, to complement the protocol, it is important to devise mechanisms to generate and evaluate offers
and rewards that they may be committed to enact. In particular, we do so with respect to the following requirements
[21]:
(1) Techniques must exist for generating proposals and for providing the supporting arguments—this demands that
agents be endowed with strategies to generate offers. Here we will assume no prior information about the oppo-
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models in this area [13,15]). In such situations, the heuristic-based approach has a proven track record of eliciting
good outcomes and so this is the approach adopted here. Generally, these mechanisms assume no knowledge
of the opponent and decide on offers and counter-offers according to the behaviour of the opponent (behaviour-
dependent tactics), the deadline of the agent (time-dependent tactics), and the amount of resources available
(resource-dependent tactics) [12]. In this section (and later ones) we develop a heuristic that is tailored to the
problem of repeated negotiations.
(2) Techniques must exist for assessing proposals and their associated supporting arguments—this means that agents
need to be able to evaluate the beneﬁt of proposals and rewards to them. This is normally captured by evaluating
theincomingoffersagainsttheagent’spreferencestructureorutilityfunction.However,aswewillsee,inrepeated
encounters, agents do not know the outcome of future games a priori; that is, there exists some uncertainty about
such outcomes. This uncertainty needs to be taken into account in the decision making of the agents in prior
games. Currently, however, there is no negotiation technique that deals with strategies speciﬁcally tailored for
such repeated encounters, but here we aim to use persuasive negotiation to do so in order to reduce the uncertainty
of future outcomes through the use of rewards.
(3) Techniques must exist for responding to proposals and their associated supporting arguments—here again the
heuristic-based models have been shown to provide good responses to offers and counter-offers. In particular, we
will give special attention to those heuristic-based models that try to achieve Pareto-efﬁciency in the bargaining
encounter because such models have been shown to take less time to come to better agreements overall [13]. In
so doing, we also aim to develop a bargaining mechanism that seeks the most efﬁcient partitioning of resources.
In general, through persuasive negotiation, we give agents a means of inﬂuencing future negotiations through re-
wards, rather than just exchanging offers and counter-offers that only impact the outcome of the present encounter.
Given that negotiation normally occurs over the partitioning of some resource, the rewards, in our case, aim to con-
strain this partition by imposing bounds on agreements that could be achieved in future negotiations. Thus, promises
of rewards (asked for or given) partially determine the partitioning of resources to be negotiated at a later time (see
example in Section 1).
To this end, in this section, we develop a Reward Generation Algorithm (RGA) that generates rewards based on
offers calculatedby other techniques(such as resource or behaviour-basedtactics).Moreover,in Section5, we develop
a speciﬁc persuasive negotiation strategy that builds upon the RGA to generate both offers and rewards.
From this section onwards, we will focus on the speciﬁc features of repeated negotiation games described in
Section 2 and abuse the notation slightly to denote the set of outcomes in the ﬁrst game by O1 and those in the second
by O2 (On in the more general case). Thus, in the speciﬁc setting we consider, the proposal p and reward q speciﬁed
by persuasive illocutions such as reward(α,β,p,q)and askreward(α,β,p,q)are such that p ∈ O1 and q ∈ O2.10 In
so doing, what we represented as a reward in Section 3, for example q ∈ O for a reward given by α, is now translated to
a set of constraints (using operators ,=,) that α will abide by in a contract O2 ∈ O2. Similarly, normal negotiation
illocutions such as propose(α,β,p)and accept(α,β,p)only consider offers from the ﬁrst game, that is, p ∈ O1.
Given this, we ﬁrst discuss when rewards can justiﬁably be used to persuade an opponent and then move on to
describe how such rewards are generated by combining the different components of the RGA. Finally, we devise
evaluation functions to assess the utility that can be obtained from rewards and the offers they support. In so doing,
we describe how agents decide whether to counter-offer or accept a given offer.
4.1. When to use rewards
In PN, agents try to give rewards or ask for rewards in order to get their opponent to accept a particular offer.
Rewards are about giving a higher utility outcome to an opponent (when given) or a higher utility to the agent asking
for it in the second game. Given this, rewards are speciﬁed in the second game in terms of a range of values for each
issue. Thus, giving a reward equates to specifying a range such as vx > 0.5 for issue x in O2 ∈ O2 to an agent whose
utility increases for increasing values of x. Conversely, asking for a reward means specifying a range such as vx < 0.4
in O2 for the asking agent (whose utility increases for decreasing values of x). Now, agents may ﬁnd it advantageous
10 Here we do not consider rewards which could be illocutions as suggested in Section 3, but these could easily be implemented by extending the
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Fig. 1. Determining the outcome of the second game according to the offer made in the ﬁrst game.
to accept such rewards if it costs them more to counter-offer (due to their discount factor) or if they risk passing their
deadline (or their opponent’s). Here, we do not deal with the issues related to whether the agents keep to their promises
or how to tackle the uncertainty underlying this (we simply assume they do), but rather we focus on the reasoning
mechanism that the agents require in order to negotiate using rewards. In more detail, a reward can be given or asked
for in the following contexts:
• A reward is proposed when the agent can still manage to achieve its target L after reaching an agreement and
giving the reward. This may happen if agent α is asking β to concede in the ﬁrst game, giving α more utility
in the ﬁrst game. Agent α may then afford to forsake some utility in the second game (which it values less due
to discounting effects). It may do so by conceding in the second game and this acts as a reward. Note here that
the reward may cost the sender something as well and it therefore needs to estimate the cost of this reward with
respect to Lα properly before committing to giving the reward.
• A reward can be asked for by an agent if it is able to concede in the ﬁrst game so as to catch up in the second
one. In this case, the agent asking for the reward has some costs in conceding in the ﬁrst game and entices the
opponent to pledge to something in return (a concession in the second game) for the concession in the ﬁrst game.
The agent asking for the reward also needs to ask for a reward that is commensurate with its target and the level
of concession it is making.
The above reasoning is captured in Fig. 1. As can be seen, given a contract O1 offered by α, a reward from α to
β would be to propose a negotiation range that is more favourable to β (i.e. make offers with high utility for β)i n
the second game. The agreement reached in the ﬁrst game would then be of higher utility for α. The converse applies
when agent α asks β for a reward. These procedures can be seen as a trade-off mechanism often used in negotiation
whereby agents trade-off gains in the present (or the future) in return for gains in the future (or in the present) [33]. In
general, there are three main ways agents stand to gain from using rewards in this manner:
(1) Agents may be able to reach an agreement faster in the ﬁrst game by providing some guarantees over the outcome
of the second game. For example, when α speciﬁes that it will negotiate for only a third of the pie in the second
game, β might prefer to accept this offer instead of delaying the negotiation as it would result in both the ﬁrst and
second pie being worth a signiﬁcant amount less than its target Lβ. This, in turn, reduces negotiation time and
hence the less discounted is the outcome in the ﬁrst and second games.
(2) The negotiation mechanism can be more efﬁcient in that it allows agents to explore a larger negotiation space over
which they may have different preferences. This may happen particularly if α has a lower discount factor than β.
For example, β can trade-off a third of the second pie, which its opponent values more, against higher proﬁts in
the ﬁrst game.
(3) Agents may be able to reach an agreement faster in the second game, since not much of the negotiation space is
left to be searched if a reward has been given or asked for. For example, α and β only have to negotiate over a
third of the pie in the second game rather than the whole pie.S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 815
Require: O1 ∈ O1,L
1: Compute concessions in Oα
1 and O
β
1 .%Here the agent determines how much both agents concede on the
issues for which they have a higher and lower |δU| than their opponent.
2: Select O2 ∈ O2 that matches the level of concession in O1
3: Check whether the combination of O1 and O2 satisﬁes L, adjust [vmin,vmax] for second game according to values in O2 and send offer and
reward.
Algorithm 1. Main steps of the RGA.
4.2. The reward generation algorithm
Building on the reasoning mechanism presented in Section 4.1, we now develop our reward generation algorithm
(RGA). Its role is to determine the level of concession made in the ﬁrst game, and hence set the value of the corre-
sponding reward, and to decide whether to send it or not. First, we assume that an agent has some means of generating
offers O1 which comply with its negotiation ranges for each issue. These can be generated using what is termed a
negotiation tactic [12]. In line with much work on negotiating in the presence of deadlines, we assume the agent’s
negotiation tactic concedes to some extent until an agreement is reached or the deadline is passed. Then, at each step
of the negotiation, based on the concessions made in an offer O1 ∈ O1, RGA computes the reward O2 ∈ O2 and
decides if it is to be asked for or given. In more detail, Algorithm 1 outlines the main steps of RGA which are then
detailed in the following subsections.
4.2.1. Step 1: Compute the concession degrees
In this context, the degree to which an agent concedes in any game is equivalent to the value it loses on some issues
to its opponent relative to what the opponent loses to it on other issues. Assuming (x = vx
1) ∈ O1 is the value of an
issue x, and [vx
max,vx
min] is its negotiation range, then we define:
Ux
1 = Ux

vx
1

Ux
max = max

Ux

vx
min

,Ux

vx
max

Ux
min = min

Ux

vx
max

,Ux

vx
min

From these, we can compute the maximum an agent could get as:
Umax =

x∈X(O1)
wxUx
max
the minimum as:
Umin =

x∈X(O1)
wxUx
min
and the actual utility as:
U1 =

x∈X(O1)
wxUx
1
where wx is α’s relative weight of issue x and

wx = 1. These weights can be ascribed the same values given to the
weight the issue has in the utility function (see Eq. (1)) and can be normalised for the number of issues considered
here. Then, the concession degree on the offer O1 is computed as:
con(O1) =
Umax −U1
Umax −Umin
(2)
It is then possible to calculate concessions on issues with higher and lower |δU| for α using conα(Oα
1 ) and conα(O
β
1 )
respectively. Then, the complement of conα(Oα
1 ) or conα(O
β
1 ) (i.e. 1−conα(Oα
1 ) and 1−conα(O
β
1 )) represents how
much β concedes to α from α’s perspective (or how much α exploits β).816 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
4.2.2. Step 2: Determine the rewards
To determine which agent concedes more in the game (given that they play a MMPD), α needs to compare its
degree of concession on the issues with higher |δU| than β (i.e. O
β
1 ) and those with lower |δU| than β (i.e. Oα
1 )( i n
a zero sum game this is calculated for all issues). This means determining what are the different conditions when
conα(Oβ) is compared with the concession (1 − conα(Oα))o fβ (as perceived by α). To this end, we deﬁne three
conditions which refer to the case where α concedes as much as β (COOP) (i.e. it cooperates), concedes more to β
(CONC) (i.e. it concedes), and concedes less than β (EXPL) (i.e. it exploits) respectively as follows:
• COOP = true if conα(Oα
1 )+conα(O
β
1 ) = 1( i . e .α has no grounds to give or ask for a reward).
• CONC = true if conα(Oα
1 )+conα(O
β
1 )>1( i . e .α should ask for a reward).
• EXPL = true if conα(Oα
1 )+conα(O
β
1 )<1( i . e .α should give a reward).
The above conditions capture the fact that an agent can only ask for a reward if it is conceding in the ﬁrst game and
can only give one if it is exploiting in the ﬁrst game. It is possible to envisage variations on the above rules as agents
may not always want to give a reward to their opponent if they are exploiting in the ﬁrst game or they may want to
ask for one even if they are not conceding. However, these behaviours could be modelled in more complex strategies
(which we will consider in future work). But, in so doing, an agent may also risk a failed negotiation. Here, therefore,
we focus on the basic rules that ensure agents try to maximise their chances of reaching a proﬁtable outcome.
Now, having determined whether an argument is to be sent or not and whether a reward is to be asked for or given,
we can determine the value of the reward. Given that an agent α aims to achieve its target Lα, the value chosen for a
reward will depend on L and on (conα(Oα
1 ), conα(O
β
1 )) (i.e. the degrees of concession of the agent). We will consider
each of these points in turn (and ignore the agent identiﬁer where it is clear from the context).
Given O1, the ﬁrst game standing offer, the minimum utility α needs to get in the second game is l2 = L−U(O1).
We then need to consider the following two cases (remember e− (θ+t) is the maximum that can be obtained in the
second game with discounts):
(1) If l2  e− (θ+τ+t) it is still possible for α to reach its target in the second game (provided the agents reach an
agreement in the ﬁrst one) and, therefore, give (or ask for) rewards as well. The larger l2 is, the less likely that
rewards will be given (since less can be conceded in the second game and still achieve L). Note that τ is added to
the discounting effect to denote that an agent will take some time to send the next illocution.
(2) If l2 >e − (θ+τ+t), it is not possible to give a reward, but an agent may well ask for one in an attempt to achieve a
value as close as possible to l2.
For now, assuming we know l2  e− (θ+τ+t), it is possible to determine how much it is necessary to adjust the
negotiationrangesforallorsomeissuesin O2 inordertoachieve l2.Speciﬁcally,theagentcalculatestheundiscounted
minimum utility l2
e (θ+τ+t) it needs to get in the second game. Then, it needs to decide how it is going to adjust the utility
it needs on each issue, hence the equivalent bound vout for each issue, in order to achieve at least l2
e (θ+τ+t). Here, we
choose to distribute the utility to be obtained evenly on all issues. Other approaches may involve assigning a higher
vout (hence a higher utility) on those issues which have a higher weight in the utility function. In so doing, vout
may constrain the agent’s ranges so much for such issues that its negotiation ranges may not overlap with that of its
opponent and result in no possible agreement between them. Our approach tries to reduce this risk. Thus, the required
outcome vout of an issue in the second game can be computed as:
vout = U−1
x

l2
e− (θ+τ+t)
	
(3)
Having computed the constraint vout, the agent also needs to determine how much it should reward or ask for. To
this end, the agent computes the contract ¯ O which satisﬁes the following properties:
conα ¯ Oα
2

= conα
O
β
1

and conα ¯ O
β
2

= conα
Oα
1

This is equivalent to our heuristic described in Section 4.1 where the level of concession or exploitation in the offer in
the ﬁrst game (i.e. here O1 = Oα
1 ∪O
β
1 ) is mapped to the reward asked for or given in the second one (i.e. here ¯ O2 =S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 817
¯ Oα
2 ∪ ¯ O
β
2 ). Then, assuming linear utility functions and ﬁnite domains of values for the issues, the above procedure
is equivalent to reﬂecting the level of concession on issues with higher |δU| by α onto those with higher |δU| for β.
This is the same as inverting Eq. (2) given a known Umax and Umin (as deﬁned in step 1), and ﬁnding vx
1 by assigning
Ux
1 = U1 and inverting Ux
1 for each issue (a procedure linear in time with respect to the number of issues considered).
Let us assume that for an issue x this results in a bound vr (a maximum or minimum according to the type of argument
to be sent). Thus, from ¯ O2, α obtains bounds for all issues in the rewards it can ask from or give to β. Given this, we
will now consider whether to send a reward based on how vr and vout compare.
4.2.3. Step 3: Decide whether to send the offers and the rewards
Assume that α prefers high values for x and β prefers low ones and that it has been determined that a reward
should be offered (the procedure for asking for the reward is broadly similar and we will highlight differences where
necessary). Now, α can determine whether a reward will actually be given and what its value should be according to
the following constraints:
(1) vr  vout: α can promise a reward deﬁning an upper bound vr on the second game implying that α will not ask
for more than vr. This is because the target vout is less than vr and α can, therefore, negotiate with a revised upper
bound of v 
max = vr and a lower bound of v 
min = vout. When asking for a reward, α will ask for a lower bound vr
(i.e. v 
min = vr) and negotiate with its normal upper bound vmax in order to achieve a utility that is well above its
target.
(2) vr <v out: α cannot achieve its target if it offers a reward commensurate with the amount it asks β to concede in
the ﬁrst game. In this case, α revises its negotiation ranges to v 
min = vout (with vmax remaining the same). Thus,
the agent does not send a reward but simply modiﬁes its own negotiation ranges. Now, if it were supposed to ask
for a reward, α cannot achieve its target with the deserved reward. However, it can still ask β for the reward vr (as
a lower bound) and privately bound its future negotiation to v 
min = vout while keeping its upper bound at vmax.I n
so doing, it tries to gain as much utility as possible.11
Now, coming back to the case where l2 >e − (θ+τ+t) (implying vout >v r as well), the agent that intends to ask for
a reward will not be able to constrain its negotiation range to achieve its target (as in point (2) above). In such cases,
the negotiation range is not modiﬁed and the reward may still be asked for (if CONC = true).
Given the above ﬁnal conditions, we can summarise the rules that dictate when particular illocutions are used and
negotiation ranges adjusted, assuming an offer O1 has been calculated and O2 represents the associated reward as
shown in Algorithm 2. With all this in place, the next section describes how the recipient of the above illocutions
reasons about their contents.
4.3. Evaluating offers and rewards
Having discussed how agents would generate rewards, we now describe how an agent evaluates the offers and
rewards it receives. Generally, when agents negotiate through the standard alternating offers protocol, the proponent
accepts an offer from its opponent only when the next offer the proponent might put forward has a lower (discounted
due to time) utility for itself than the offer presented to it by their opponent. This is expressed as in Rule 1.
However, agents using persuasive negotiation also have to evaluate the incoming offer together with the reward
they are being asked for or are being given. From the previous section, we can generally infer that a reward implies
a value vr that deﬁnes either a lower or an upper bound for a given issue in the next negotiation game. For example,
a reward to be given by a seller might be a guaranteed discount (i.e. a lower limit price) on the next purchase by the
current buyer which could also have been a reward requested by the buyer. Therefore, given this bound, the agent may
infer that the outcome of any given issue will lie in [v 
min,v 
max] which might be equivalent to or different from the
agent’s normal negotiation ranges [vmin,vmax] and may take into account the agent’s target vout (given its target l2)o r
the value vr itself.
11 The difference between the constraint applied by the reward and by the target is that the reward applies the constraint to both agents, while the
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if COOP or (EXPL and vout >v r)f o ra l lx ∈ X(O2) then
propose(α,β,O1).
end if
if CONC and l2  e− (θ+τ+t) then
askreward(α,β,O1,O2) and modify [vmin,vmax] for second game.
end if
if CONC and l2 >e − (θ+τ+t) then
askreward(α,β,O1,O2).
end if
if EXPL and vout  vr for all x ∈ X(O2) then
reward(α,β,O1,O2) and modify [vmin,vmax] for second game.
end if
Algorithm 2. Step 3 of RGA.
if U(Onext)·e β(τ+t) U(Ogiven)·e− βt then % U(Ogiven) is the offer given
by α and Onext is β’s possible next offer
accept(β,α,Ogiven)
end if
Rule 1. Accepting an offer in the usual case.
Generally, we can assume that given a negotiation range [v 
min,v 
max], an agent may be able to deﬁne an expected
outcome of that range using a probability distribution (e.g. uniform, normal, gamma) or some reasoning based on its
negotiation strategy (e.g. a conciliatory strategy would expect a lower utility gain in the second game as compared to
a non-conciliatory one when faced with a non-conciliatory opponent). This probability distribution may be estimated
from previous interactions with the opponent or knowing the behaviour of the opponent’s bargaining strategy and its
relationship with the agent’s own bargaining position [17,33]. Given this expected outcome for any issue, the agent
may then calculate the expected utility (determined according to the bounds set by the reward) of that reward along
with the utility of the offer to which it is tagged. Moreover, using the same procedure it can calculate the expected
utility of any reward or offer that it might want to send next. By comparing the two sets of utilities, it can then make a
decision as to whether to accept or counter-offer in the next step. We detail such a procedure as follows.
Assume β is the agent that is the recipient of a reward (given or asked for) and that β prefers small values for the
issue x being considered. Then, let β’s negotiable range be [vmin,vmax] for the issue x and β’s target be l
β
2 in the
second game (which implies that it needs at least v
β
out for the issue in the second game).
Now, if β receives reward(α,β,O,Oa) (or askreward(α,β,O,O 
a)), meaning that Oa is its reward for the second
game, then Oa implies that vα
r is the upper bound proposed by α for each issue x in Oa (vα
r would be a lower bound
in O 
a). In the meantime, β has calculated another offer Onew w i t har e w a r dOb in which a bound v
β
r is to be given
to each issue x in Ob. Then, for each issue x, β calculates the negotiable ranges for the second game given vα
r as
[vmin,vα
r ] (or [vα
r ,min{vout,vmax}] if O 
a is asked for) while it calculates [v
β
r ,min{v
β
out,vmax}] given v
β
r . We assume
β can then calculate (using a probabilistic technique) the expected outcome of each range as evα
x for [vmin,vα
r ] (or
[vα
r ,min{vout,vmax}] in the case of O 
a) and ev
β
x for [v
β
r ,min{v
β
out,vmax}]. Given each of these expected outcomes
for each issue, the overall expected outcomes, EOa and EOb, of the second game can be calculated for each type of
reward respectively as:
U(EOa) =

x∈X(EOa)
wx ·U

evα
x

(4)
U(EOb) =

x∈X(EOb)
wx ·U

evβ
x

(5)
where EOa is the expected outcome of the reward given by α, EOb is the expected outcome of the reward given by β, 
wx = 1 and wx is the weight given to each issue in the utility function (as per Eq. (1)). These weights for the
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if U(Onew)·e− β(τ+t)+ U(EOb)·e− β(θ+τ+t) U(O)·e− βt +U(EOa)·e− β(θ+t) then
accept(β,α,O)
else
reward(β,α,Onew,Ob) or askreward(β,α,Onew,Ob)
end if
Rule 2. Evaluating a received reward when about to give or ask for a reward.
if U(O 
new)·e− β(τ+t)+U(EO 
b)·e− β(θ+τ+t) U(O)·e− βt)+U(EOa)·e− β(θ+t) then
accept(β,α,O)
else
propose(β,α,O 
new)
end if
Rule 3. Evaluating a received reward when about to send a normal offer.
the agent will have to compute the value of expected outcomes in the second game with the future weights in order to
be consistent.
Given that the expected outcomes have been calculated, then the agent decides to accept or counter-offer using
Rule 2. This evaluates the offer generated against the offer received to decide whether to accept the offer received or
send the reward illocution (note the addition of discount factors to reﬂect the time till the next game and in sending
the counter-offer). Note that the same principle applies if the agent were about to send an askreward instead.
Finally, we consider the case where agent β has received a persuasive offer and can only reply with another offer
without any argument. In this case, β calculates the expected outcome of the second game without any constraints
(i.e. using its negotiation range [vmin,vmax] to elicit EO 
b). Rule 3 therefore compares the utility of the offer received
against the utility of the offer generated and the outcome expected in the next game to decide whether to propose or
to accept. Note here that the second game is left more uncertain in this case since the bounds have not been changed
by any reward. This means that the agent cannot guarantee that it will meet its target and can also result in the agents
taking more time to reach an agreement in the second game (as in the case of non-persuasive tactics as we show
in Section 6). As we have seen in this section, the generation of rewards and evaluation of offers assume that there
is an offer based upon which rewards can be computed. Given this, in the next section, we discuss and remove this
assumption by developing a novel tactic that uses the RGA to generate offers and rewards.
5. The reward-based tactic
As described in the previous section, RGA requires an offer generated by some negotiation tactic in order to
generate the accompanying reward. In this vein, the most common heuristic-based tactics can be classiﬁed as:
(i) behaviour-based (BB)—using some form of tit-for-tat or (ii) time-based—using Boulware (BW) (concedes little
in the beginning before conceding signiﬁcantly towards the deadline) or Conceder (CO) (starts by a high concession
and then concedes little towards the deadline) [12].12 Now, many of these tactics engage in positional bargaining [17]
by starting from a high utility offer for the proponent (here α) and gradually conceding to lower utility ones. In turn,
this procedure automatically causes RGA to start by promising rewards and then gradually move towards asking for
rewards. This is because these tactics generate offers that are exploitative at the beginning of the negotiation. As the
agent gradually concedes on its initial offer during the negotiation, the reward generation mechanism would ask for
rewards instead. Thus, it is not possible for these tactics to ask for rewards at the beginning of the negotiation. This can
signiﬁcantly reduce the efﬁciency (in terms of the sum of utilities of the agents) of the negotiation encounter since one
of the agents may be better off conceding the second game if it has a low discount factor   and, in return, exploit the
ﬁrst game (as discussed earlier in Section 1). This would mean that the more patient agent (i.e. the one with a lower
12 Other negotiation tactics might also be resource-based or dependent on other factors. The tactics we select here have been chosen because they
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discount factor  ) could ask for a reward in the second game or the other agent could offer a reward in the second
game.
To ground our work, we present a novel reward-based tactic (RBT) (based on Faratin’s trade-off tactic [13]) that
either asks for or gives a reward at any point in the negotiation in order to reach an agreement. To do so, however, the
agent needs to know how to evaluate incoming offers and generate counter-offers accordingly. We will consider three
main cases in calculating the best response to an offer and a reward. These are:
(1) An offer and a reward have been received and it is possible to counter-offer with a reward.
(2) It is not possible to counter-offer with a reward and the last offer involved rewards.
(3) It is not possible to counter-offer with a reward and the last offer did not involve rewards.
We show how the algorithm deals with each of these cases in turn.
5.1. Case 1: Counter-offering with a reward
In this case, an offer and a reward have been received and it is possible to counter-offer with a reward (according to
the RGA). Thus, an agent α needs to calculate combinations of rewards asked for or given with offers and choose the
combination which it deems most appropriate to send to β. To calculate these combinations, α ﬁrst needs to determine
the overall utility each combination should have. To achieve this, we use a hill climbing method similar to Faratin et
al.’s [13] model. In this method, the agent tries to ﬁnd an offer that it believes is most favourable to its opponent,
while not necessarily conceding too much. In our case (particularly for utility functions based on the MMPD), this
procedure equates to the agent trying to gain more utility on the issues on which it has a higher |δU| and less on
those for which it has a lower |δU| than β.13 In so doing, the strategy tries to maximise joint gains in the repeated
negotiation encounter.
Therefore,tocalculatethebestcombinationofofferandrewardforanagent α tosendinthehill-climbingapproach,
α ﬁrst calculates the utility of the next offer it intends to send and then ﬁnds the offer and reward that optimally match
this utility value. By optimality, in this case, we mean that either the offer or the reward should also be the most
favourable one to β. Thus, the utility of the next offer is calculated according to the difference that exists between
α’s previous offer and the last one sent by β and the step in utility α wishes to make from its previous offer. The size
of this utility step can be arbitrarily set. Given a step of size f ∈[ 1,∞], the utility step is calculated by the function
Su: O1 ×O2 ×O1 ×O2 ×[1,∞] → [0,2] as follows:
Su(O1,O2,O 
1,O 
2,f)
=
e− t(U(O1)e−2 τ +U(EO2)e− (θ+2τ)−U(O 
1)e− τ −U(EO 
2)e− (θ+τ))
f
(6)
where O1 and EO2 are α’s previous offer and expected outcome in the second game from α’s reward O2 respectively,
O 
1 and EO 
2 are the current offer and the expected outcome of β’s reward O 
2 respectively. In case Su returns zero or a
negative value, α would accept the offer and reward (after applying the evaluation rules deﬁned in Section 4.3). When
a reward is not speciﬁed by the agents, the utility calculated by the function only considers the offers made by each
agent (i.e. remove U(EO ) and U(EO 
2) from its calculation).
Given the utility step Su, it is then possible to calculate the utility Nu of the combination of the next offer and
reward using the following equation:
Nu = U(O1)e− (2τ+t)+U(EO2)e− (θ+2τ+t)−Su(O1,O2,O 
1,O 
2,f) (7)
Given that rewards specify bounds on the negotiation in the second game, each combination that can be offered in
a step represents a space of possible agreements in the second game given an offer in the ﬁrst one. Therefore, ﬁnding
a combination that more closely matches the opponent’s offer and reward equates to ﬁnding another space of offers
that is close to the opponent’s space that covers its latest offer and reward. This procedure is pictured in Fig. 2.
13 Note this is different from the point discussed in Section 4.2.2 since here we do not constrain the negotiation ranges, but rather search for offers
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Fig. 2. The hill climbing performed by RBT for an agent α to ﬁnd an appropriate reward and offer in response to the offer and reward by agent β.
The shaded semi circles represent spaces over which different offers and rewards have the same utility for α. Each new offer by α is made closer to
agent β’s previous offer.
Given previously received and proposed offers and rewards, ﬁnd (O1,O2) such that:
– maximise conα(Oα
2 ) to give a reward to β.
– maximise conα(O
β
2 ) to ask for a reward from β.
subject to:
– Uα(O1,O2) = Nu
– ∀(x = v)∈ O1,O2,vmin  v  vmax % i.e. all values need to be within the negotiation range.
Optimisation Model 1. Computing the best counter-offer and reward.
As can be seen in this ﬁgure, in our tactic, α calculates the most favourable combination of offer and reward for
agent β that achieves the utility Nu. In so doing, our tactic aims to make offers that are closest to those preferred
by β in a few steps without losing much utility. In calculating a reward to be given we take into account the fact
that in the MMPD the opponent likes some issues more than others and by maximising the opponent’s gain on these
issues we ensure that the reward is more attractive to the opponent. In the same way, when a reward is asked for,
the associated offer is calculated such that the values of the issues in the offer are more favourable to the opponent
on those issues it prefers most according to the MMPD. To calculate these offers and rewards, we solve the problem
deﬁned by Optimisation Model 1 using Linear Programming techniques in order to calculate the reward that is either
most favourable to β or to α. Algorithm 1 therefore runs through the RGA to ﬁnd the best possible rewards and the
associated offers whose combined utility are equal to Nu. However, Algorithm 1 can also fail to ﬁnd an optimal output
(as a result of the constraints being too strong (e.g. the target L being too high) or the optimiser not being able to ﬁnd
the solution in the speciﬁed number of steps) and, in these cases, we resort to the procedure described in case 2.
5.2. Case 2: Counter-offering without rewards given previous rewards
In this case, the agent cannot ﬁnd a combination of an offer and a reward whose utility matches Nu. Therefore,
the agent calculates an offer using one of the standard heuristic-based tactics outlined at the beginning of this section.
In this case, BB tactics would not be appropriate to generate an offer given previous offers by the opponent since
these offers may also be associated to rewards. This means that the offers by themselves (which would be used in
BB to calculate the next offer) do not exactly depict the concessions that the agent has made leading to BB tactics
misunderstanding the behaviour of the opponent. This, in turn, could lead to an offer by a BB agent where it concedes
more than it should. Therefore, either BW or CO are used to generate the offer since these are independent of the
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Given previously received and proposed offers, ﬁnd (O1) such that:
– maximise conα(Oα
1 ) % i.e. maximise α’s concessions on issues β has a high |δU|.
subject to:
– Uα(O1) = Nu
– ∀(x = v)∈ O1,vmin  v  vmax % i.e. all values need to be within the negotiation range.
Optimisation Model 2. Computing the best counter-offer.
5.3. Case 3: Counter-offering without rewards given no previous rewards
In the event that β only proposes an offer without any rewards, our tactic needs to be able to respond by a similar
procedure (as in case 1) in order to continue the same step-wise search for an agreement. In this case, our tactic
calculatesthe offer whose utilityis equalto Nu (without U(EO 
2) in Eq.(7)). Moreover,theoffer calculatedis such that
it is the one that is most similar to the offer by β. This is achieved by solving the problem deﬁned in the Optimisation
Model 2. This calculates an offer O1 such that O1 maximises the level of concession the opponent likes most as in
the previous case while still achieving Nu. In case the issues being negotiated are qualitative in nature, the similarity
based algorithm by [13] may be used.
6. Experimental evaluation
In this section, we describe a series of experiments that aim to evaluate the effectiveness and efﬁciency of our
PN reasoning mechanism. To this end, we pitch agents using the RGA and RBT against a number of non-persuasive
negotiation tactics using standard benchmark metrics. We ﬁrst detail the experimental settings and describe the types
of agents we benchmark our algorithm against as well as the metrics used in our tests. Given this, we provide the
results of these tests and go on to analyse the performance of the RBT under different parameter settings.
6.1. Experimental settings
The scenario we consider involves agents playing two negotiation games as per the rules discussed in Section 2.
The general settings that apply to the two negotiation games are as follows:
• The pair of negotiating agents have their utility functions shaped by the MMPD (as discussed in Appendix A).
The actual utility the opponent obtains for particular values of the issues are not known since utilities are private.
Thus agents α and β negotiate over 4 issues x1,...,x4 where x1 and x2 (e.g. price or bandwidth) are more valued
by α than β, while x3 and x4 (e.g. usage of service or time of payment), are more valued by β than α.
• The agents have their utility functions Uα and Uβ speciﬁed over each issue as per Table 2. As can be noted, the
weights and gradients of the utility functions are chosen such that they respect the conditions of the MMPD (as
detailed in Appendix A).
• The maximum time for a negotiation game to take place (tmax) is set to 2 seconds, which allows around 300
illocutions to be exchanged between the two agents.14 Unless stated otherwise, the agents’ deadlines, tα
dead and
t
β
dead, are then deﬁned according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 2 seconds.
•  α and  β—the discount factors are set to a value between 0 and 1 drawn from a uniform distribution (unless
stated otherwise).
• Lα and Lβ—the targets of the agents are drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 2 (unless stated
otherwise).
• θ and τ—θ is set to 0.5 seconds (meaning that the second game is discounted by e−0.5 ) for each agent while τ is
set to 0.0001 (meaning that the utility of each offer is discounted by e−0.0001 ) to simulate instantaneous replies
(unless stated otherwise).
14 Experiments were run using MATLAB 7.1 on a 2 GHz Intel PC with 1 GB of RAM. Preliminary experiments with the negotiation tactics
suggest that if the agents do not come to an agreement within this time period, they never achieve any agreement even if the maximum negotiation
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Table 2
Utility functions and weights of issues for each agent
Agent Utility function and weight of each issue
Ux1, wx1 Ux2, wx2 Ux3, wx3 Ux4, wx4
α 0.4x1,0 . 5 0 .9x2,0 . 2 1−0.2x1,0 . 2 1−0.6x2,0 . 1
β 1−0.2x1,0 . 4 1−0.6x2,0 . 1 0 .9x2,0 . 3 0 .4x1,0 . 2
•[ vmin,vmax]—the negotiation range for each issue and each agent are deﬁned (and privately known) using λ,
the degree of alignment of the negotiation ranges. For example, if λ = 1, the two negotiation ranges overlap
completely, while if the degree of alignment is 0, the negotiation ranges do not overlap at all. The degree of
alignmentisarbitrarilysetto0.8torepresentthefactthatagentshaveareasonablylargesetofpossibleagreements
that they could reach and still achieve their target.
We will further assume that the ﬁrst offer an agent makes in any negotiation is selected at random (but having a high
utility for the agent). Also, the ﬁrst agent to start the negotiation is chosen at random. This random choice reduces any
possible ﬁrst-mover advantage a strategy may have over another (i.e. which loses less utility due to discount factors).
Moreover, in order to calculate the expected outcome of the second game (as discussed in Section 4.3), agents draw
the outcome for each issue from a normal distribution with its mean centred in the middle of the agent’s negotiation
range for the second game with a variance equal to 0.5. Finally, in all our experiments we use ANOVA (ANalysis Of
VAriance) to test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the results obtained.
6.2. Populations of negotiating agents
In order to benchmark the RBT against standard negotiation tactics, we create three groups of agents. First, we
create agents which use RBT to negotiate in the ﬁrst game. These agents then use any of the standard tactics (discussed
inSection5)inthesecondgame.Second,wecreateagroupofagents,calledPNT(forPersuasiveNegotiationTactics),
which use the RGA rewards. They do so by generating offers using standard tactics (BB, BW, or CO as deﬁned in
Section 5) and plug in such offers in the RGA to obtained the compatible rewards. In the second game, PNT agents
simply use the same standard tactics to generate offers. Third, we create a group of agents, called NT (for Negotiation
Tactics), which only use standard negotiation tactics to generate offers in both games (see [12] on how to implement
standard tactics in more detail).
In the following experiments, we use homogeneous populations of 80 agents for each of NT, PNT, and RBT and
also create a heterogeneous population of equal numbers of RBT and PNT agents (40 each) which we refer to as
PNT&RBT to study how RBT and PNT agents perform against each other.
6.3. Efﬁciency metrics
As argued in Section 1, one of goals of PN is to achieve better agreements faster than standard negotiation mech-
anisms. To test whether our PN model achieves this, we use the following metrics:
• Average number of offers—this is the average number of offers that agents need to exchange before coming to
an agreement. To calculate this, we record the number of offers made each time an agreement is reached and
calculate the average of these over the total number of negotiations. Note that each time an offer is made a short
time τ elapses. A lower average equates to a shorter time before agents come to an agreement (mutatis mutandis
if the average is high). Moreover, the lower this average, the lower is the loss in utility as a result of the discount
factors  . Thus we can deﬁne a time-efﬁcient tactic as one that takes a relatively small number of offers to reach
an agreement.
• Success rate—this is the ratio of agreements reached over all pairs of games to the number of times agents meet
to negotiate. The larger this success rate, the better the negotiation tactic is at ﬁnding an attractive offer for the
opponent.
• Average utility per agreement—this is the sum of the utilities of both negotiating agents over all agreements
divided by the number of agreements reached. The higher this value, the better is the strategy at ﬁnding an824 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
outcome that brings a high utility to both participating agents. Thus we deﬁne a socially efﬁcient negotiation
tactic as one which brings a high sum of utility in the outcome.
• Expected utility—this is equal to the average utility weighted by the probability that an agreement is reached.
The probability is calculated by dividing the total number of agreements by the number of encounters agents
have. Thus, if the agents ﬁnd an agreement on all encounters, there is a probability of 1 that they will come to an
agreement in a future encounter. A strategy with a high expected utility is one which is most likely to reach high
utility agreements every time it meets other strategies.
Having deﬁned our evaluation metrics, we next detail the results of our experiments.
6.4. Comparing persuasive and non-persuasive strategies
When agents play two negotiation games, in the ﬁrst one, NT (without the reward generation mechanism) is only
able to make offers and evaluate offers, while PNT is able to both generate and evaluate offers and rewards. Given
that persuasive strategies like PNT and RBT can constrain their rewards according to their target L (as shown in
Section 4.2.2), we also need to allow other non-persuasive tactics to constrain their ranges accordingly to ensure a fair
comparison. Thus, we allow all tactics to constrain the ranges of the issues in the second game according to their target
whenever they reach agreements without the use of any rewards (i.e. using only a propose illocution). The procedure
to do so is similar to that described in Section 4.2.2 where vout, as calculated in Eq. (3), is used as the bound on the
negotiation range of the second game but without the use of rewards.
Given this, we postulate a number of hypotheses regarding the performance of RGA and RBT and describe the
results which validate them.
Hypothesis 1. Negotiation tactics that use the RGA are more time efﬁcient than those that do not.
This hypothesis follows from the fact that we expect rewards to help agents ﬁnd an agreement faster. We impose the
following basic settings on the interactions: Lα = Lβ = 0.8, tα
dead = t
β
dead = 1s , α =  β = 0.1, θ = 1 s, and λ = 0.8.
These settings are chosen to represent symmetric conditions for both agents and impose relatively few constraints on
the two negotiation games that agents play. The symmetric nature of the interaction ensures that no tactic is in a more
advantageous position to its opponent. Here we recorded the average number of offers (the lower this number the
more time efﬁcient the agents are) an agent makes in order to reach an agreement. For all populations of tactics, each
agent meets another agent 50 times and this is repeated 15 times and the results are averaged. We recorded the results
in Table 3. Thus, it was found that NT takes an average of 547 offers to reach an agreement, while PNT agents take
58 and the combined PNT and RBT population takes around 56 offers per agreement. The performance of only RBT
agents is signiﬁcantly better than the other populations since they reach agreements within only 26 offers (which is
less than NT by a factor of 21).15 These results validate Hypothesis 1. Now, the reason for the superior performance
of persuasive tactics in general is that the rewards make offers more attractive and, as we expected, the shrinkage of
negotiation ranges in the second game (following from the application of the rewards) further reduces the negotiation
space to be searched for an agreement. The additional improvement by RBT can be attributed to the fact that every
RBT agent calculates rewards and offers (through the hill-climbing algorithm) that give more utility to its opponents
on issues for which they have a higher marginal utility (as explained in Section 5). Hence, this is faster than for
PNT&RBT in which only one party (the RBT) performs the hill-climbing.
These results suggest the outcomes of RBT and PNT populations should be less discounted and should also reach
more agreements (since they take less time to reach an agreement and hence do not go over the agents’ deadlines).
However, it is not clear whether the utility of the agreements reached will be signiﬁcantly higher than for NT agents.
This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Negotiation tactics that use the RGA achieve a higher success rate, expected utility, and average utility
than those that do not.
15 Using ANOVA, it was found that, using a sample size of 15 for each population, and α = 0.05, that F = 2210 >F crit and p = 8 × 10−74,
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Table 3
Benchmark results
Tactic No. of offers Success rate Average utility Expected utility
RBT 26 1.0 2.02 2.02
PNT&RBT 56 1.0 1.95 1.95
PNT 58 0.99 1.9 1.88
NT 547 0.87 1.84 1.6
To test this hypothesis, we run the same experiments as in the previous case and record the average utility per
agreement and the number of agreements reached. Thus, it is possible to calculate the expected utility, average utility
per encounter, and the success rate per game as explained earlier. These are recorded in Table 3.
ThusitwasfoundthatthesuccessrateofpersuasivestrategiesisgenerallymuchhigherthanNTstrategies(0.87/en-
counter for non-persuasive strategies, 0.99/encounter for PNT strategies only, 1.0/encounter for RBT and PNT, and
1.0/encounter for RBT only).16 This result clearly shows that the use of RGA increases the probability of reaching
an agreement. The similar performance of RBT and PNT&RBT and the difference between PNT&RBT and PNT
shows that RBT agents, as well as being able to ﬁnd agreements readily with their similar counterparts, are also able
to persuade PNT agents with more attractive offers. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that the average utility of persuasive
strategies is generally higher (i.e. 1.9/encounter for PNT, 1.95/encounter for PNT&RBT, and 2.02/encounter for RBT)
than NT (i.e. 1.84/encounter). Note that the difference in utility between NT and other tactics would be much greater
if discount factors  α and  β were bigger (given the high average number of offers NT uses (i.e. 547)).
Given the trend in success rate and average utility, the expected utility follows a similar trend with NT agents
obtaining 1.6/encounter, PNT 1.88/encounter, RBT and PNT 1.95/encounter, and 2.02/encounter for RBT agents
only.17 Generally speaking, from the above results, we can conclude that RGA, used together with basic tactics,
allows agents to reach better agreements much faster and more often.
These results also suggest that PNT agents reach broadly similar agreements (in terms of their utility) to NT agents
(if we discount the fact that rewards signiﬁcantly reduce the time to reach agreements and increase the probability of
reaching an agreement). Now, as discussed in Section 5, PNT agents usually generate offers ﬁrst (starting from high
utility ones as for the NT agents) and then calculate the rewards accordingly. Given this, the agents tend to start by
giving rewards and end up asking for rewards. As the negotiation proceeds (if the offers are not accepted), the offers
generally converge to a point where agents concede nearly equally on all issues (irrespective of the marginal utilities
of the agents) and the rewards converge to a similar point. This, in turn, results in a lower overall utility over the two
games than if each agent exploits the other one in each game in turn. Now, if rewards are selected in a more intelligent
fashion, as in RBT, the agents reach much higher overall utility in general. This is because agents exploit each other
more on the issues for which they have a higher marginal utility than their opponent. This is further demonstrated by
the results of the RBT agents which suggest they reach agreements that have high utility for both participating agents.
It can also be noticed that the performance of mixed populations of RBT and PNT agents perform less well than
RBT agents and slightly better than a pure PNT population (see results above). This suggests that the RBT agents can
ﬁnd agreements that convince their PNT opponent more quickly as they are able to propose better rewards and offers
than PNT agents. However, it is not apparent whether RBT agents are able to avoid being exploited by their PNT
counterparts in such agreements which RBT tries to make more favourable to PNT agents (as described in Section 5).
Given this, we postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Agents using RBT are able to avoid exploitation by standard tactics connected to RGA (i.e. PNT).
16 Using ANOVA, it was found that for a sample size of 15 for each population of PNT, PNT and RBT, and PNT only, with α = 0.05, F = 8.8 >
Fcrit = 3.15 and p = 4.41 × 10−4. These results conﬁrm that there is a signiﬁcant difference between the means of PNT and the other strategies.
The success rate of NT agents were always lower than the other populations in all elements of the sample.
17 These results were validated statistically using ANOVA, where it was found that F = 3971 >F crit = 2.73, and p = 7.36×10−80, for a sample
size of 15 per population and α = 0.05. These results mean that there is a signiﬁcant difference between the means of the populations.826 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
In order to determine which tactic is exploited, we recorded PNT’s and RBT’s average utility separately.18 Thus,
it was found that on average, both RBT and PNT agents obtained about the same average utility per agreement (i.e.
0.96/encounter). This result validates the above hypothesis and suggests that the hill-climbing mechanism of RBT
agents calculates offers that can convince the opponent without reducing the utility of both RBT and PNT agents
signiﬁcantly (i.e. in small steps) and also that it maximises joint gains through Algorithm 1.
In general, through the above experiments we have empirically demonstrated the usefulness of rewards in bar-
gaining. Thus, we have achieved our initial aim of using PN to enable agents to achieve better agreements faster. In
the following section, we further study RBT to see how it is affected by different conditions in the environment to
understand what are the important factors that affect the efﬁciency of our persuasive negotiation strategy.
6.5. Evaluating the reward based tactic
In this section we further explore the properties of RBT by studying its behaviour when key attributes of the agents
are varied. As can be deduced from Section 4, there are a large number of attributes that can affect the behaviour
of RBT, but here we will focus on the following main ones which we believe have a signiﬁcant impact on both our
reward generation component and the behaviour of RBT. These attributes are:
(1) L—the target determines the size of the reward that can be given to or asked for as determined by vout in Eq. (3)
and the procedure described in Section 4.2.2. Given this, varying L allows us to study the effectiveness of PN in
general as the possibility of asking for or giving a reward changes. Moreover, we aim to study the effect of one
agent having a lower or higher target than its opponent on the outcomes of negotiations.
(2)  —the discount factor dictates the utility of offers, as well as rewards. In particular, we aim to see how RBT and
our reward generation mechanism can help agents that have different discount factors ﬁnd good agreements.
(3) θ—the delay before the second game is played determines the value of the reward. Increasing this value can
signiﬁcantly reduce the value of a reward to an agent. By varying θ we aim to see how it impacts on the use of
rewards during negotiation and how this affects the outcome of each game.
In all of these experiments we compute the 95% conﬁdence interval of each result and plot these as error bars on the
appropriate graphs in order to show the statistical signiﬁcance of the results.19
First we investigate the impact of the negotiation target L on the outcome of negotiations. In this context, L is used
to decide whether a reward should be sent or not and what the negotiation ranges of an agent should be in the second
game (see Section 4.2.2). The higher the value of L, the less agents are likely to be able to construct rewards. This is
because an agent may have to shrink the negotiation range in the second game more in order to achieve a higher L
over the two games. Therefore, we expect the agents to achieve fewer deals and have a corresponding lower overall
expected utility. Moreover, in the case where only one agent has a high L, then the opponent’s rewards are less likely
to be accepted because these rewards are less likely to allow the agent to achieve its target, and hence the agents are
less likely to come to agreements or take more offers to come to any agreement. In this case we would also expect
the agent with the higher L to negotiate more strongly and constrain the second game more such that it should get a
higher utility than its opponent. To investigate these intuitions, we will consider a pair of agents α and β that use RBT
and postulate the following experimental hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. The higher the value of Lα relative to Lβ, the higher is the average utility of α compared to that of β.
To test Hypothesis 4 we ran an experiment where the agents were made to negotiate using similar settings as in the
previous section, except for the fact that Lα was varied between 0 and 1.5 while Lβ was kept ﬁxed at 0.5. The results
of the experiment are shown in Fig. 3.
18 We validated this result using ANOVA with a sample of size 15 per strategy and α = 0.05. Thus it was found that the null hypothesis (i.e. equal
means for the two samples) was validated with F = 0.13 <F crit = 4.10 and p = 0.71 > 0.05.
19 If the error bars overlap any two points, it indicates that there is no signiﬁcant difference between these points. Otherwise there is a signiﬁcant
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3. Expected utility, average number of offers, and average utility of agents when Lα is varied. (a) Expected utility of α and β when Lβ = 0.5
and Lα are varied. (b) Average number of offers between α and β when Lα is varied. (c) Average utility of α and β when Lβ = 0.5a n dLα is
varied.
As can be seen from Fig. 3(a), the overall expected utility of both agents rises sharply at Lα = 0.7 and there is a
sharp rise in the number of offers exchanged between the two agents (in Fig. 3(b)). Moreover it was found that the
success rate of the agents did not drop. The main cause for the jump in expected utility and rise in the average number
of offers can be explained by the results shown in Fig. 3(c). As can be seen, from Lα = 0.7, α’s utility gradually rises
while β’s utility sharply falls. This means that α exploits β on all the issues that are negotiated.
In more detail, in order to obtain Lα = 0.7 and above, α would need to exploit β in the ﬁrst game on all the issues
it prefers more than β or exploit β on all issues (which it likes less or more than β) in the second game. This can be
deduced from the weights used in the utility functions shown in Table 2. Therefore, at this point, α and β are likely
to exploit each other maximally on the issues they prefer in each game. This results in a high point in utility since it
represents the cooperate–cooperate point in the MMPD (hence the peak in Fig. 3(a)). When Lα < 0.7, the agents can
still ﬁnd agreements without completely exploiting their opponent on any issue and therefore agree to proposals and
rewards that result in a lower overall utility since the outcome then lies further away from the cooperate-cooperate
point of the MMPD.
Beyond Lα = 0.7, it becomes harder for α to give or ask for any rewards. This is because as Lα increases, the use
of rewards decreases as α’s ability to concede in either game decreases (since it needs to achieve a high target) and α
can only constrain its negotiation ranges more and more in the second game in trying to achieve its target (as discussed
in Section 4.2.3). However, given that Lβ = 0.5 <L α, β can still afford to be exploited by α and still manage to reach
its target over the two games. Hence the success rate of the two agents does not decrease. However, given the more
stringent demands of α, the agents are likely to exchange a larger number of offers (i.e. β conceding a signiﬁcant
number of times) until an agreement is reached.828 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
In general, these results validate Hypothesis 4 and also conﬁrm our intuition that α’s bargaining power should
increase with respect to its target. Given these results, it can be expected that if the second game were less discounted,
α could have started exploiting β at a higher value than 0.75. We will therefore explore such discounting effects on the
negotiation and investigate the effect of increasing both agents’ targets at the same time to see the general behaviour
of the system as the discounts and targets are varied.
Before doing so, however, we next study the effect of the discount factor  α on the outcome of the negotiation
(keeping  β = 0.5). In this case, a low value of  α equates to a low discounting effect on the outcome of the two
games and conversely for a high value of  α. Therefore we can expect that as  α gets higher the agreements reached
in the two games would be much more discounted and hence result in a lower overall expected utility. Moreover, with
higher   values, agents will ﬁnd it harder to achieve their target L as they will value both offers (and counter-offers)
and rewards less. Agents are then likely to take more offers to reach an agreement and reach fewer agreements as
well. In the case where only  α is varied, we would expect that the agent with the higher discount factor would be
more likely to accept any offer by its opponent since counter-offering might take up time that discounts its own offer
more than the one offered by the opponent. This means that the more patient agent is likely to get its offers more
easily accepted (i.e. take fewer numbers of offers on average) and exploit its opponent more. Hence, as predicted by
game theoretic models of bargaining [25], the more patient agent gets an increasingly higher average utility than its
less patient opponent as the difference between their discount factors increases. We therefore postulate the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. The higher the value of  α relative to  β, the less agents are likely to reach agreements and the more
offers they will take to reach an agreement.
To test this hypothesis, we ran a similar experiment as above apart from the fact that we kept the target for both
agents at Lα = Lβ = 0.5 and we varied  α between 0 and 4 (while keeping  β = 0.5). In this context, it is obvious that
the overall expected utility of the agents will decrease when  α increases (and the utility α gets decreases as a result
of the discounting effect). Given this we recorded the average utility of each agent and the number of offers they take
to reach an agreement. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
As can be seen from Fig. 4(a), β’s utility slightly decreases as  α rises. The number of offers used by the agents also
rises signiﬁcantly as  α increases beyond 1.44. This is because, beyond  α = 1.44, the discounting of the second game
is such that it is worth less than 0.5 (assuming α exploits all issues in the second game). Thus, it becomes impossible
for α to ask for rewards and it can only rely on giving rewards. Moreover, as the discounting effect increases, it also
becomes harder for β to convince α with them. Eventually, as time passes, the agents can only rely on offers and α
constrains its negotiation ranges in the next game so as to achieve its target. Given this, negotiations take even more
time in the second game (as in the previous experiment). Therefore, the target slightly reduces the advantage of β’s
patience (i.e. in having a lower discount factor) in this type of game. It was also found that the success rate of the
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Average utility and average number of offers made as  α is varied. (a) Average utility of α and β when  α is varied. (b) Average number of
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Varying the target and discount factor of α and β and the resulting expected utility and number of agreements reached. (a) Expected utility.
(b) Success rate.
agents does not signiﬁcantly decrease (from 1 to 0.999) after  α = 1.44. This suggests that the agents sometimes run
out of time trying to convince each other. This may happen when a poor agreement is reached in the ﬁrst game and
α constrains its negotiation ranges in the second game so much that no agreement is possible. These results therefore
validate Hypothesis 5.
Given the above results, we can expect that the combined effect of an increasing target and an increasing discount
factor should signiﬁcantly reduce the expected utility of both agents and increase the number of offers they need to
make to come to an agreement. We therefore postulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 6. The higher the value of Lα and Lβ, the lower the expected utility of both agents.
Hypothesis 7. The higher the value of  α and  β, the less agents are likely to reach agreements and the more offers
they will take to reach an agreement.
Therefore, we varied both agents’ discount factors and targets to see which had a stronger effect on the negotiation
outcomes. The plot of the expected utility and the success rate is shown in Fig. 5.
As can be seen from Fig. 5(a), the expected utility is more signiﬁcantly affected by Lα and Lβ.20 The results
conﬁrm Hypotheses 6 and 7. A jump in utility (as in the experiment for Hypothesis 4) is noticed at particular values
in the agents’ target, corresponding to points where the agents need to try and exploit each other maximally and
constrain their negotiation ranges in the second game so as to achieve this. However, beyond a certain point, agents
are not able to exploit each other maximally any more and cannot use rewards to achieve their target. This results in
a decrease in the number of agreements reached as shown in Fig. 5(b). Moreover, we notice that the point at which
the expected utility drops relative to target values decreases in  . This conﬁrms our initial intuition that the discount
factor inﬂuences to some extent the effect of the target on the expected utility.
We also recorded the average number of offers made by the agents to see the impact of the target and discount
factors on it. The results are shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen, the drop in expected utility is reﬂected by the jump
in the number of offers made. The region where the peak occurs corresponds to values of the targets and discount
factors where the agents are still able to use rewards to persuade each other and signiﬁcantly shrink their negotiation
ranges in the second game to reach their target. Beyond this peak (i.e. for higher values of the targets in particular), the
agents can only ﬁnd agreements in the ﬁrst game and they do so according to the hill- climbing mechanism of RBT
(which guarantees that they meet in a few number of steps). Note that the plateau at low values of L is at a lower value
than that at high values of L, suggesting that rewards can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of offers made to reach an
agreement compared to those that only make offers using the hill climbing method.
20 Note that jumps above a success rate of 1 (similarly for jumps of expected utility above 2) are only due to curve ﬁtting rather than actual results.830 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
Fig. 6. Impact of L and   on the average number of offers.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Impact on offers and rewards when varying θ. (a) Average number of offers per encounter as θ is increased. (b) Percentage of agreements
made without rewards as θ is varied.
Finally, given that higher values of   decrease the probability that agents reach an agreement and increase the
number of offers exchanged, we expect a similar effect for higher values of the delay. This is because a longer delay
decreases the value of rewards to both agents, and hence reduces the probability of reaching each agent’s target L.
Therefore, we expect that the longer the delay θ, the lower the success rate of the agents and the higher the average
number of offers needed to reach an agreement. Given this, we postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8. The higher the value of θ, the less likely it is that agents will use rewards and the more offers they take
to reach an agreement.
As for the above hypotheses, we ran a similar experiment keeping Lα = Lβ = 0.5 and  α =  β = 0.5, varied θ
between 0 and 5 seconds, and recorded the expected utility of the agents. The success rate of the agents did not
decrease signiﬁcantly, while the number of offers signiﬁcantly increased when θ increased beyond 3 seconds as
shown on Fig. 7(a). These results conﬁrm Hypothesis 8. The reason for the jump in the number of offers at θ = 3
has a similar explanation to that in the previous experiment for  α = 1.44. Indeed at θ = 3, the total value of the
second game decreases below 0.5 and decreases the value of rewards that can be given or asked for. This results
in the agents only being able to make offers without rewards and hence they increase the constraints on the second
negotiation, which, in turn, increases the number of offers needed to reach an agreement. To conﬁrm these results,
we also recorded the number of agreements reached without the use of rewards. As shown in Fig. 7(b), it was indeed
found that the number of agreements reached through without the use of rewards increases as θ increases.S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 831
7. Related work
In this paper we have dealt with both repeated negotiations and PN. We previously presented a preliminary version
of our PN strategy in [36]. In this paper, we have elaborated on the protocol, discuss the evaluation functions in more
detail, and thoroughly evaluate the associated reasoning mechanism. In the following subsections we survey the main
work that has been carried out in both areas and distinguish ours from it.
7.1. Repeated negotiations
Repeated negotiations or repeated games have long been studied in game theory [26]. In particular, the closest
work to ours in this area is that of Muthoo [24,25] who analysed the equilibrium offers that arise when agents bargain
repeatedly over a number of issues. In a similar vein, Busch and Hortsmann [9] have analysed the equilibrium offers
that arise when agents need to decide whether to negotiate all the terms of a long term relationship in one go or settle
the agreement incrementally at different points in time. Their results imply that it might be better in some cases to
go for short term deals rather than long term ones since the former imply lower negotiation costs. In our case, the
heuristics we employ in the RGA follow a similar line of thought in that the outcome of the second game is not
completely negotiated in the ﬁrst one. This, in turn, reduces the time to come to an agreement and hence agents do not
lose a signiﬁcant amount of utility due to discounting effects.
In the multi-agent agent systems area, repeated negotiations have mostly been considered in terms of repeated
(sequential) auctions [8,14,16]. These works have looked at equilibrium strategies that agents should use in such
auctions under settings of complete information. Our work differs from this, and the game theoretic approaches in
general, in that we look at a decentralised bargaining interaction where agents do not have any knowledge about their
opponent and need to ﬁnd the best agreements possible. This is, we believe, a more realistic situation although it
requires us to turn to heuristic methods and empirical evaluations rather than analytical solutions and proofs.
7.2. Persuasive negotiation
A number of approaches to PN have considered various aspects of the problem over the last few years since the
seminal work of Sycara [40–42] and the challenges identiﬁed by Tohmé [45] and Jennings et al. [21]. First, we note
the work on the language to describe the domain (hence the content of rewards), as well as to communicate persuasive
arguments [22,27,39]. In our work, we mainly build upon [39] in order to construct the domain and communication
languages for the use of rewards. However, our work differs in that we additionally consider rewards that can be asked
for and we also specify social commitments that are entailed by illocutions exchanged during negotiations. Moreover,
we additionally specify a reasoning mechanism and a tactic for PN.
Second, in terms of reasoning mechanisms for PN, we note the work of [22] which speciﬁes arguments such as
threats,rewards,orappeals,intermsoflogicstatements.However,thesemanticsofsuchargumentsarenotcompletely
speciﬁed and the choice over which argument to send is made according to a number of ad hoc rules. Building upon
this, [35] proposed a reasoning mechanism that also considered threats, rewards, and appeals. In their case, arguments
were abstract elements that gave some utility to the agents. The choice of the arguments to send was then determined
according to how trustworthy an opponent is using a number of fuzzy rules [34]. More recently, [2,3] provided a
formal model of arguments (such as threats, rewards, and explanatory arguments) along with the logic to determine
the force of an argument. They also specify a mechanism to identify conﬂicts between threats, rewards, or appeals.
Their conception of rewards is similar to ours in that they capture the gains from the reward in terms of the gains
from the goals that the reward achieves. However, they do not specify any negotiation protocol, nor any negotiation
algorithm that determines when and with which offers to send rewards or threats. Moreover, they do not study how
threats and rewards bring about better negotiation outcomes.
In general, none of the above approaches have ever concretely instantiated arguments in terms of a standard negoti-
ation scenario as we do. Moreover, none of the above algorithms have been benchmarked against standard negotiation
algorithms, and hence, the gains they claim to generate have never been properly quantiﬁed. In contrast, we have
shown that our approach can generate signiﬁcant gains over standard negotiation tactics in various respects.832 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a comprehensive model of persuasive negotiation that enables agents to achieve
better deals in repeated encounters than was previously possible using standard negotiation tactics. In particular, we
focus on the use of rewards, as rhetorical arguments, that can either be given or asked for. Speciﬁcally, these rewards
deﬁne the constraints that can be imposed on the set of possible agreements in future negotiation games, contingent
upon the opponent agreeing to the offer they support in the current encounter.
The model consists of two parts: a protocol and a reasoning mechanism. In terms of the protocol, we have used
dynamic logic to specify the commitments that arise in persuasive negotiation based on the exchange of rewards. In
so doing, we ensure that the negotiation dialogue between agents can be checked for consistency and that the ensuing
commitments are stored. Our PN protocol is the ﬁrst to consider the commitments that result from asking for or giving
out rewards in a negotiation encounter.
In terms of the reasoning mechanism, we deﬁne how an agent can generate, select, and evaluate rewards and
offers. This decision making model is composed of the Reward Generation Algorithm that computes rewards that can
be asked from or given to an opponent and a set of functions that permit the evaluation of incoming and outgoing
offers and rewards. The RGA is based on the simple principle that concessions made in previous games need to be
compensated for by future rewards. We have also shown how the RGA can easily be connected to non-persuasive
negotiation tactics in order to generate rewards in repeated encounters. Building upon this decision making model, we
developed a new Reward Based Tactic that permits the generation of rewards to be asked for or given to an opponent
at any point in the negotiation. The RBT strives to achieve Pareto-efﬁcient deals by ensuring that the most preferred
outcomes are selected for the negotiating agents. In so doing, it has been shown to reduce the number of offers that
agents need to make to come to an agreement, and also to enable agents to achieve higher utility deals than standard
benchmark tactics in the MMPD domain.
In particular, our results show that RGA can enable agents using standard negotiation tactics to make a 17% gain
in utility in repeated encounters. More importantly, RBT has been shown to generate agreements that are 26% better
than these standard tactics using 21 times fewer messages. Note that these results are only indicative of the possible
improvement that PN could bring since our agents are made to interact under the speciﬁc setting of an MMPD.
Other settings could be envisaged, but we expect similarly positive results since the MMPD is generally considered
to capture the canonical properties of the interactions we aim to apply PN to. Moreover, we have analysed the RBT’s
properties and shown that the most important factor that impacts on the number of offers exchanged and the average
utility achieved is the target that the agents set themselves to achieve. An agent’s target determines how aggressively
it will try to come to an agreement and when it can offer or ask for rewards. Thus, the higher the target, the less likely
it will be able to give rewards and the more likely it will be to ask for rewards. In the extreme case, given the principle
we apply in the RGA, agents may not be able to claim or give rewards at all since they may have to avoid making any
concession in order to achieve their target.
In general, our work raises a number of theoretical and practical issues. First, in allowing for rewards in repeated
encounters, we extend the bargaining problem initially posed by Rubinstein [37]. Now, such problems are usually
studied to deduce their equilibrium properties using bargaining theory [25]. This is important in order to understand
the interplay of such factors as the agents’ targets and discount factors and their impact on the negotiation outcome.
However, we believe that PN mechanisms like ours will undoubtedly generate more complex interaction scenarios.
These scenarios will therefore raise a number of more complex theoretical issues that will need to be addressed.
Second, the fact that an agent’s reasoning mechanism is much more sophisticated than that for standard negoti-
ation tactics, indicates that the design of such agents is likely to become more challenging as the complexity of the
arguments they can exchange increases. This means more structured approaches in terms of methodologies and frame-
works, will be needed for designing PN agents [32]. Such approaches should help deﬁne and standardise the reasoning
mechanism of agents in such a way that different types of arguments, protocols, or decision making functionalities
can be interconnected and adapted to ﬁt particular application contexts.
Third, while we have shown that PN can be beneﬁcial to the constituent agents, it is also important to study
which system-wide properties emerge when PN mechanisms are used. In this vein, it is usually expected that the
decentralised, bilateral negotiations based on the standard negotiation tactics we presented can rarely achieve the level
of efﬁciency guaranteed by centralised auction-based approaches. However, given that PN techniques can support
much richer interactions than existing automated bilateral negotiation mechanisms, it is possible to exchange moreS.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 833
meaningful information which could lead agents to achieve better deals (as in our case). This could, in turn, lead to
better efﬁciency at the system level. Hence, it is important to study how beneﬁcial such PN mechanisms could be
relative to auction-based approaches and identify the trade-offs that result from their use.
Finally, while RBT has been shown to be better than the standard tactics in MMPD-based repeated encounters,
it is but one of many other tactics that could be envisaged in the future to be used in different or similar contexts.
Given this, it would be interesting to use techniques such as evolutionary game theory or genetic algorithms to see
how these strategies change the performance of agents when pitted against other different strategies [48]. This would
help determine which strategy to choose when an agent is placed in any given population.
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Appendix A. Devising utility functions
Theprisoner’sdilemma(PD)iswellknownforitsapplicabilitytoverygeneralformsofinteractions[5].Indevising
utility functions according to the PD, we aim to build more realistic and interesting interaction scenarios than zero-
sum games [25,37]. In particular, the characterisation of the agents’ utility functions in terms of a PD is done so
as to model general interactions where each agent (in a pair) prefers some issues more than his counterpart. This is
commonly the case where, for example, high-volume traders are able to enjoy economies of scale such that they value
the price of the goods they sell less than what individual customers probably would. Another example would be a car
seller who has high costs in getting a car with a special colour while the buyer may not have such strong feelings for
such a colour.
With respect to the PD, in the case of a bargain, cooperation means that the agent agrees to concede while a
defection means that the agent exploits its opponent. In order to devise utility functions that are appropriate for this
work (which assumes that more than two values may be enacted for any issue) we require that there be more than
just two moves (i.e. Cooperate or Defect) that are present in the standard version of the PD. In particular, we need
a continuous scale of cooperation between these two extremes. To this end, we extend the prisoner’s dilemma to
the multi-move prisoner’s dilemma (MMPD) [7,29,46]. In the MMPD, actions (or moves) are considered to be the
enactment of the contents of a contract (e.g. paying for goods, delivering goods). Both the interaction partners have
their own actions dictated by the part of the contract that they have to enact (e.g. seller delivers goods and buyer pays
for the goods at a given time). Agents may also have more than one issue to take care of (e.g delivery of goods and
ensuring they are of a certain quality) and for each issue a discrete number of possible values can be given (e.g. paying
after 3 days, 4 days, ... or delivering after 1 month, 2 months).
In the following section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the action set (possible moves) of the agents which will interact via the
MMPD.Then,we providea formaldeﬁnitionoftheMMPD(withrespectto multi-issuecontracts).The lastsubsection
shows how we can devise the utility functionsof the agentsso that they can engage in a MMPD. These utility functions
are then used by the agents in experiments we describe in Section 6.
A.1. The action set
Whenever a contract is signed, each agent is given its part of the contract to enact. In order to simplify notation, we
will note as Oα those issues that α enacts in a contract and Oβ as those that β enacts (which is a slight modiﬁcation
to the formalism we introduced in Section 2). In effect, the achievement of the issue-value pairs (xi = vi) in an agent’s
part of the contract is its ‘action’ or ‘move’ in the game. Thus, an agent α can generate its action set O(Oα) for the
MMPD by deﬁning all the possible assignments of the values of the issues that it controls. This is expressed as:
O

Oα
=

Oα ={ x1 = v1,...,xn = vn}|xi ∈ X

Oα
,vi ∈ Dxi

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Table A.1
Multi-move prisoner’s dilemma
α’s part/β’s part Oα
i Oα
j
O
β
k Uβ(Oα
i ∪O
β
k ),Uα(Oα
i ∪O
β
k )U β(Oα
j ∪O
β
k ),Uα(Oα
j ∪O
β
k )
O
β
l Uβ(Oα
i ∪O
β
l ),Uα(Oα
i ∪O
β
l )U β(Oα
j ∪O
β
l ),Uα(Oα
j ∪O
β
l )
Each agent thus has all its possible actions deﬁned and these actions result in a payoff for each agent similar to a
prisoner’s dilemma with a discrete multi-action set (as opposed to a binary action set).
A.2. The game
The MMPD is represented as a matrix where each row (and column) corresponds to a particular degree of co-
operation from one of the agents. Therefore, a contract O between agents α and β can be represented as a point in
the matrix where Oα
i is α’s action and O
β
k is β’s action such that O = Oα
i ∪ O
β
k . The sub-indexes of the different
contracts correspond to a row i and a column k respectively in the matrix. We assume that a total order applies over
all the possible contracts (in the matrix) according to the utility of each contract to the agent concerned when moving
along a single row or column. This means that for an agent α, Oα
i and Oα
j , where j>i , are two possible executions
but Oα
j is a defection (or exploitation) by α (or a cooperative move i.e. a concession by β) resulting in greater utility
for α and utility loss for β,i fβ agrees on O
β
k (i.e. staying on the same column). Let Oα be the set of contracts handled
by α and Oβ similarly for β.
We can then deﬁne the multi-move prisoner’s dilemma as follows for Oα
j representing a defection from Oα
i by α
and O
β
l representing a defection from O
β
k by β:
Deﬁnition 9. Two agents α and β engage in a multiple-move prisoner’s dilemma (MMPD) over the contracts they can
choose iff, for any four points in the matrix: ∀Oα
i ,Oα
j ∈ Oα, where Uα(Oα
i )<Uα(Oα
j ) and ∀O
β
k ,O
β
l ∈ Oβ where
Uβ(O
β
k )<Uβ(O
β
l ), the following rules are respected:
(1) Defection Rules (an agent can exploit another’s cooperation by defecting (i.e. exploiting), but ends up with a
lower payoff if the other side also defects):
Uα
Oα
i ∪O
β
l

<Uα
Oα
j ∪O
β
l

<Uα
Oα
i ∪O
β
k

<Uα
Oα
j ∪O
β
k

Uβ
Oα
i ∪O
β
l

>Uβ
Oα
j ∪O
β
l

>Uβ
Oα
i ∪O
β
k

>Uβ
Oα
j ∪O
β
k

(2) ParetoEfﬁciencyRules(thesumoftherewardswhenbothcooperate(i.e.concede)ishigherthanthesumobtained
if either or both of the agents defect (i.e. exploit)):
Uα
Oα
i ∪O
β
k

+Uβ
Oα
i ∪O
β
k

>Uα
Oα
j ∪O
β
k

+Uβ
Oα
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β
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Oα
j ∪O
β
k

+Uβ
Oα
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β
k
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Oα
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β
l
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β
l

From the above rules it is then possible to derive the following payoff matrix for any pair of possible contracts to
be chosen by both agents:
We next deﬁne the utility functions that do respect the payoff structure of the MMPD. To this end, we propose the
following theorem:
Theorem 10. Let X be a given set of issues, α and β be two agents, with Xα being issues under α’s control and
Xβ being issues under β’s control (with X = Xα ∪ Xβ). Assume that the utility for α of a contract O = (x1 =
v1,...,xn = vn) over issues X(O)⊆ X is of the form Uα(O) =

xi∈X(O)ωα
x ·Uα
xi(vi) and analogously for agent β,
Uβ(O) =

xi∈X(O)ω
β
x · U
β
xi(vi), where Uα
xi and U
β
xi are the utility functions for α and β of the individual issue xi.S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837 835
Moreover we assume that Uα
x (v) and U
β
y (u) are differentiable (strictly) increasing functions for any x ∈ Xα(O) and
y ∈ Xβ(O) respectively, and differentiable (strictly) decreasing otherwise.
Then, Uα and Uβ respect the aforementioned defection and Pareto-efﬁciency rules of a multi-move prisoner’s
dilemma if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) ωβ
x ·

−
dU
β
x
dx
	
>ω α
x ·
dUα
x
dx
(A.2)
for all issues x ∈ Xα(O).
(ii) ωα
y ·

−
dUα
y
dy
	
>ω β
y ·
dU
β
y
dy
(A.3)
for all issues y ∈ Xβ(O)
where the inequalities are point-wise.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume X(O)={ x,y},Xα ={ x} and Xβ ={ y}.L e tO = (x = v,y = u)
be the agreed contract. We begin by considering a defection by agent α in an issue x from the value v to a value v  such
that Uα(v )>Uα(v) (given that everything else remains the same). For an easier notation we will write Uα(v,u) to
denote the utility of agent α on a contract (x = v,y = u), similarly for agent β, and U(v,u)for Uα(v,u)+Uβ(v,u).
From the defection and Pareto-efﬁciency rules of the MMPD we have the condition
U(v,u)>U(v ,u),
and using our assumptions on the utilities Uα and Uβ (from Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3)), this means:
ωα
xUα
x (v)+ωβ
xUβ
x (v) > ωα
xUα
x (v )+ωβ
xUβ
x (v ) (A.4)
that is, we have the equivalent condition to be required:
ωβ
x

Uβ
x (v)−Uβ
x (v )

>ω α
x

Uα
x (v )−Uα
x (v)

(A.5)
Now, under general assumptions, we have:
Uα
x (v )−Uα
x (v) =
v  

v
dUα
x
dx
dx (A.6)
and
Uβ
x (v)−Uβ
x (v ) =−
v  

v
dU
β
x
dx
dx (A.7)
Hence, applying the condition expressed in Eq. (A.2) of the theorem to Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) we have Eq. (A.5)
satisﬁed, and hence U(v,u)>U(v ,u)as well (where u  is a defection by α from u). Similarly, the same procedure
can be applied to Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) above using Eq. (A.3) such that a defection by agent β changing the agreed
value y = u to any new value y = u , with Uβ(u )>Uβ(u) (given the opponent does not defect in each case), yields
U(v,u)>U(v,u ).
Finally, if both agents defect to say x = v  and y = u , with Uα(v )>Uα(v) and Uβ(u )>Uβ(u) (given all else
stays the same), then we obviously have the desired inequalities which actually express the Pareto-efﬁciency rules:
U(v,u)>max

U(v ,u),U(v,u )

 min

U(v ,u),U(v,u )

>U( v  ,u ) (A.8)
while still having the following defection rules satisﬁed: Uα
x (v) < Uα
x (v ), U
β
y (u) < U
β
y (u ) and Uα
y (u) > Uα
y (u ),
U
β
x (v) > U
β
x (v ) (given all else stays the same). 
If the utility function of an agent α for each issue in a contract satisﬁes the conditions expressed in Eqs. (A.2)
and (A.3) with respect to its opponent β, then the two agents follow a prisoner’s dilemma. These utility functions836 S.D. Ramchurn et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (2007) 805–837
generally mean that α has a higher marginal utility than β on some issues (e.g. issues y in Theorem 10) and a lower
marginal utility on other issues (e.g. issues x in Theorem 10). Then, each agreement that they could reach represents a
different degree of exploitation or concession by one of the parties concerned. The degree of concession is determined
by the difference that exists between the maximum value that an agent could obtain (if it exploited its opponent on
all issues) and the value of the agreement chosen (see Eq. (2)). The higher the exploitation, the higher utility loss is
expected from a particular contract for the opponent.
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